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0  
I n t r o d u c t i o n. 
 
        Here, I have  the opportunity to present this report, which was all supported by 
NATO funds through a grant. The NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship provided me 
with  funds that covered the research costs and made it possible for me to complete the 
report successfully. 
                  The analysis of public opinion polls presents a number of difficulties of 
methodological and substantial nature. The merits are connected mainly with the 
subject of analysis, whereas the methodological aspect relates to the issues documents 
are reports on public opinion polls conducted by the two most connected with the 
method of analysis of materials gathered. Basic analytical renowned Polish polling 
institutes, namely Public Opinion Research Institute (OBOP) and Public Opinion 
Research Centre (CBOS). It is necessary to add a certain technical remark here, namely 
that the time of publication will be indicated next to the descriptions of opinion polls’ 
results, whereas while presenting their content I will strive to indicate the actual time 
when such polls were conducted (insofar as it is possible to be established). We will 
also refer to opinion polls conducted by other polling centres, as well as to research that 
was occasionally conducted by other institutions. Another kind of problem is a question 
regarding the nature of questionnaires that constituted a tool used in research.  
       To what extent are the results of opinion polls achieved in different periods 
comparable? Looking at empirical results one may conclude that it is rather 
impossible to collect a fully comparable material for the entire period of the 1990s, 
mainly due to the fact that the problem of Poland joining NATO began to engross the 
attention of the society as late as in the second half of 1992.  
      As it was not the subject of a general public debate, politicians approached the 
matter very carefully as well. One should remember that political transformations that 
took place in Poland (before and after the elections on June 6, 1989) were progressing 
in an unchanged international formal arrangement. There was still the Council for 
Mutual Economic Aid, so was the Warsaw Treaty Organisation; and although 
discussions were held on far-reaching changes as to the transformation of those 
organisations, no respectable politician would give a signal then for their dissolution.  
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      One should also remember that 1989 saw the beginning of the period of 
transformation, and even where it had already happened people did not fully believe 
that such changes were irreversible. After all, there were political forces in all the 
countries ”leaving socialism” (of different number and strength) that were interested 
in preventing the so-called ”relapse of capitalism”. The best example that illustrates 
the dramatist of changes are transformation events in Romania and Moscow 
connected with ”Janajew’s coup d’etat”.  
        Therefore, while analysing opinions of the Polish public we will strive to 
present this international context and explain to what extent events outside Poland 
influenced the fluctuations of public opinion, as well as what the attitudes of post-
socialist countries’ societies were. Two political beings were of particular importance 
for the course of Polish public opinion functioning, namely Russia on the one hand, and 
creation of the so-called ”Visegrad Triangle” (in 1993) on the other. Since the time of 
emergence of ”ideas” regarding the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries 
joining NATO, Russia has been their strong opponent. One may say that only at the 
beginning of 2001 statements voiced by Russian politicians could indicate that Russian 
political elite has acknowledged the fact and in a sense ceased opposing it. Throughout 
the major part of the 1990s, however, the relations between Russia and Poland were 
tense due to, among other things, Polish intentions. Especially the first reactions of the 
representatives of Russian political elite were nearly hysterical. One may even propose 
a thesis that the issue of former Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries joining NATO 
integrated, quite uncommonly, various groups on the Russian political scene (that were 
normally at variance with one another). Even Michail Gorbachov, perceived as one of 
the more practical of Russian politicians, did not conceal his discontent with that fact.  
        ”Visegrad Triangle”, in turn, was an important event in connection with the 
accession process of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (subsequently the Czech 
Republic). That fact referred both to the co-operation, and mutual political support on 
the way to NATO. At the same time there was an unofficial competition within that 
”Triangle” as to the degree of army preparedness for the integration process with 
NATO. In that period one witnessed a kind of competition as to in which country the 
support of the public opinion for the idea of integration with NATO was stronger. 
This was supposed to constitute (in the opinion of some of the politicians) an 
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important argument should the three countries not be admitted to NATO at the same 
time, but in a specified order. 
  
I.  Public opinion – elements of theory. 
 
Discussions regarding theoretical issues connected with public opinion seem 
to have more deeply been absorbing scientific circles only recently. Previously one 
focused, to a larger extent, on the empirical side, becoming sometimes fascinated by 
opinion polling.  
The object of controversy is the very fact of public opinion emergence. The range of 
concepts such as ”public opinion” and ”social opinion” has not entirely been clarified, 
either. Some authors, while describing the functioning of public opinion, negate also 
its existence in totalitarian regimes. These are just a few of the issues arousing 
controversy that are connected with theoretical aspects of public opinion. Let us try to 
address at least those indicated ones.  
1. Public opinion vs. social opinion. 
             As it has already been mentioned, many controversies are aroused by the very 
concept of public opinion. Even more numerous discussions accompany the relations 
that occur between the concepts of ”public opinion” and ”social opinion” (Młyniec 
1998: 171-172). The subject of scientific discussions is also the role that public 
opinion plays in democracy, and the question of its presence in totalitarianism 
(Sartori: 128). Many authors treat these concepts as synonymous, which considerably 
blurs the boundaries between the political and the non-political. Opinions have been 
voiced recently establishing new planes that differentiate those concepts. One may 
encounter views that perceive social opinion as ”the collection of individual opinions 
expressed by people on a given subject” (T. Goban-Klass 1997: 85), whereas public 
opinion as “judgements expressed  publicly and defended in a controversial and 
socially important matter”. 
           The concept of social opinion has a much wider range relating to the nature of 
the subjective factor (social groups that it refers to), but first of all the range of 
objective factor (i.e. areas of human activity: politics, economy, culture, upbringing, 
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education, etc.). This refers to all the phenomena and processes that can be 
encountered in social life. On the other hand, public opinion:    
 
1. relates to communities and social groups 
 2. is shaped as a result of social contacts 
 3. relates to controversial issues in the field of politics 
 4. is expressed by articulation  
 5.  is subjectively sovereign 
 
It seems that the most concise way of presenting the problem was that adopted by G. 
Sartori: “In summary – public opinion is first of all a political concept.” (Sartori 
1994: 117). 
Summing up these considerations regarding the range of public opinion and social 
opinion concepts one may distinguish the following standpoints: 
   expressed by those who perceive public and social opinion as synonyms (e.g. M. 
Iłowiecki 1997: 52)  
   and those who notice differences between public opinion and social opinion.  
    In that case two subsequent options emerge: 
1 when authors attribute the concept of social opinion to those who participate in 
social debate without the intervention of media, while associating the concept of 
public opinion with the appearance of technical media that made social opinion 
public (Ch. Tylor ). 
2 the second standpoint sees the criterion of division in the objective aspect: public 
opinion will relate to the area of politics (G. Sartorii 1994: 117, although his 
opinion seems not to be fully consistent, which I intend to demonstrate below), 
whereas social opinion would relate to all the remaining areas.  
             While continuing those theoretical considerations let us take a look at the 
views of a classic, W. Lippman. He laid a lot of emphasis on the external nature of 
public opinion, the fact of its articulation, irrespective of the form thereof. The 
importance of manifesting one’s attitudes and views in order to include them in 
public opinion is several times highlighted by T. Goban-Klas ( 1998). 
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      It is truly an important problem, especially in the context of existence of the 
so-called ”concealed public opinion”. Such thesis was formulated by V.O. Key. One 
has to admit that he also constructed a coherent definition corresponding with that 
concept believing that public opinion means ”such private judgements that the 
governing authorities in their opinion should reckon with”. Public opinion described 
in such a way pushes the problem of articulation into the background. 
 2. Analytic and synthetic approach to public opinion. 
In the subjective approach to public opinion Ch.Tylor and G. Sartori, among 
others, believe that it is acquired only in democratic systems through discussions in 
which media play the part of a mediator. Whereas the opinion that is “void of 
reflection, mediation or criticism” is described by them as the opinion “among 
people” (the “general one”), acquired only through interpersonal contacts. The 
objective approach is the standpoint of F. Ryszko who believes that public opinion is 
“an emotional response or reflection on political activities”, as well as that of W. 
Lamentowicz saying about “public issues of controversial nature”. A similar case is 
with the analytic and synthetic approach to public opinion. Analytic  approach is 
presented by Albert Vann Dicey who believes that public opinion is “a general name 
for opinions shared by a certain number of individuals”. It seems, however, that 
much closer to the truth is Charles Cooley (synthetic approach) who described 
public opinion as “not so much an aggregate of individual opinions, but an 
organisation, a collective product of communication and social interaction”. Public 
opinion is a pluralistic phenomenon, which justifies discussing only those views that 
are present within public opinion.  
  3. Problems with articulation of opinions. 
        Apart from the problem created by the relations between public and social 
opinion, there is another difficulty regarding an important, although sometimes 
ignored by certain authors, issue of articulation of views by the citizens. Without 
enabling people to express their political views they will remain political 
consciousness at the very most. Indeed, some authors use the concept of ”concealed 
public opinion” (Key 1961: 26), but I believe that this concept makes the boundaries 
between consciousness and that kind of public opinion disappear. If the majority of 
authors assume that articulation of one’s views is a necessary factor contributing to 
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the emergence of public opinion, then the absence of such a factor brings the very 
definition of ”concealed public opinion” in question. Formulation adopted by V.O. 
Key may be plausible to a certain degree when confronted with the definition of 
public opinion by that author where he says that these are ”such private judgements 
that the governing authorities in their opinion should reckon with”. (Key: 49). Let us 
continue, however, with the previously presented definition of public opinion that is 
consistent with the standpoint of the majority of respondents.  
 
4. Public opinion in democratic and non-democratic systems 
        Some authors undertake efforts aimed at establishing when and in connection 
with what conditions public opinion emerged. Let us remind the opinions of G. 
Sartori and Ch. Tylor who clearly differentiate the concept of public opinion 
distinguishing the opinion ”among people” (only widespread) and ”by people” (i.e. 
formulated by them) (Sartori 1994: 128), or “general” and “public” (Tylor 1996: 24). 
The former appears in a non-democratic society where according to G. Sartori the 
society is an object. The latter is present in democratic systems. Similar criteria are 
applied by Tylor while establishing the nature of opinion. Designations and 
arguments used by Tylor are, in terms of concepts, based on similar substantial 
foundations.  
   The first one is a “general opinion” or “opinion of the human kind” that according 
to the author is:  
A. void of reflection, 
1.  adopted without discussion or criticism,  
2.  passively implanted in every subsequent generation.  
Whereas in the second designation one emphasises that public opinion is:  
B. a result of reflection,  
1.  emerges as a result of discussion,  
2.  reflects an actively achieved consensus (Tylor 1996: 24).  
It could be possible to agree with the authors that ”opinion among people” or ”general 
opinion” can be found mainly in a country with the most radical form of 
totalitarianism. But it is difficult to accept that opinion as a general rule bearing in 
mind that political systems (including also the totalitarian ones) undergo the so-called 
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”waving”. The ”waving” process is connected with the changing degree of a given 
political system’s repressiveness (in different periods of time the reach and range of 
violence or pressure exerted by the state was undergoing changes). Another criterion 
of assessment of socialist countries’ political systems was relative repressiveness 
resulting from the fact that the intensity of use of measures that socialist countries had 
at their disposal was different in, for instance, Poland, Romania, the USSR, or China.  
       Ch. Tylor uses an argument connected with pedagogics: he believed that 
general opinion was, among other things, a result of opinions being implanted in the 
subsequent generation without any reflection. Firstly, this void of any reflection 
implanting is always a part of socialising processes (even though such a process 
assumes activity of the subject, some of the  ‘resources’ are still acquired in an 
unconscious way). Secondly, the assessment of the degree of reflectiveness or not in a 
society and - in addition - in a distant past is a rather subjective problem. Opinions 
expressed by J. Habermas, G. Sartori or Ch. Tylor present the problem of public 
opinion in a way that allows for a quite distinct division into general and public 
opinion. Let us try to ask several questions and attempt finding answers to them. 
What is it that conditions the emergence of public opinion? Is it the number of media 
that extend the area of discussion both in terms of quantity and quality?  This is the 
conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the statement that ”it is obvious that the 
emergence of public opinion requires certain infrastructure. First printed materials 
had to appear that were circulated by numerous independent sources” (Tylor 1996: 
25). Such a view could be acceptable provided that we acknowledge the historical and 
evolutional nature of public opinion development, i.e. acknowledge that this 
phenomenon was parallel to civilisation changes in all the spheres and consisted in 
the qualitative ”congestion” through the aforementioned development of civilisation 
with all consequences thereof. First there were mainly interpersonal contacts because 
they were the primary means ensuring the transfer of ideas. The exchange of those 
views and their development, however, frequently took place without the intention or 
participation of the original author. The thoughts that he expressed started ”living” on 
their own. They were subject to approval or criticism, enhanced or weakened the 
opinions of those that they reached. They contributed to the creation of a new 
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theoretical and practical quality that, although limited by the number of subjects 
participating in debates, was nevertheless present.  
     Numerous authors emphasise the important role that capitalistic transformations 
played in the shaping of public opinion. Liberalism in the economic sphere came 
together with the freedom of speech (”capitalism of print”) and extension of the range 
of political rights. The following were counted among them: ”...open, non-secret 
parliamentary debates, general trials, freedom of opinion and press. Following the 
example of England (with its „public opinion government”)...” (Schmidt 1993: 148).    
It could be possible to agree with some authors maintaining that ”opinion among 
people” or the ”general one” can be found mainly in a country with the most radical 
form of totalitarianism. But it is difficult to accept that opinion as a general rule 
taking into consideration that political systems (including also the totalitarian ones) 
undergo ”waving”. The ”waving” process is connected, among other things, with the 
changing degree of a given political system’s repressive ness (in different periods of 
time the reach and range of violence or pressure exerted by the state underwent 
changes and transformations). Another criterion of assessment of socialist countries’ 
political systems was relative repressive ness resulting from the fact that the intensity 
of use of the measures of repression and constraint that socialist states had at their 
disposal was different in, for instance, Poland, Romania, the USSR, or China and 
Cambodia.  
           Evaluating what happened with the public in socialist states, Ch. Tylor uses the 
argument connected with socialisation (pedagogies). He believes that general opinion 
was, among other things, a result of opinions being implanted in the subsequent 
generation without any reflection. Firstly, this void of any reflection implanting is 
always a part of socialising processes (even though such process assumes activity of 
the subject, some of the ‘resources’ are still acquired in an unconscious way). 
Secondly, the assessment of the degree of reflective ness or not in a society and - in 
addition - in a distant past is a rather subjective problem. Ch.  Tylor’s opinions could 
be deemed correct only in a situation when we assume that we have to do with the 
Orwell-like totalitarian system. As I have already mentioned, this ”inculcation of 
opinions” in real socialism was conducted in a differentiated way. It was different in 
Poland, the USSR or China, and even in those countries changes were taking place 
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also in time. Accepting Ch. Tylor’s point of view it would be difficult to explain how 
the disassembly of the entire system came about. Unless we assume that we owe the 
collapse of real socialism to Security Services of those states. Such ”ideas” occurred 
to people in connection with the results of the vetting process in Poland.  
         Let us try to ask several questions and attempt to find answers to them. What is 
it that determines the emergence of public opinion? Is it the quantity of media that 
extends the area of discussion both in terms of quantity and quality?  This is the 
conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of Ch. Tylor’s statement that ”it is obvious 
that the emergence of public opinion requires certain infrastructure. First printed 
materials had to appear that were circulated by numerous independent sources.” 
Acknowledgement that this phenomenon was parallel to civilisation changes in all the 
spheres and consisted in the qualitative ”congestion” through the aforementioned 
development of civilisation (with all consequences thereof) is true, but it does not 
explain when it was that public opinion emerged. How does the process of public 
opinion emergence look like in terms of quantity and quality? What is that boundary 
if we propose a thesis about the role of printing as an element that determines the 
emergence of public opinion? Undoubtedly, first these were mainly interpersonal 
contacts because they were the primary means ensuring the transfer of ideas and 
views. The exchange of those views and their development, however, frequently took 
place without the intention or participation of the original author. The thoughts that he 
expressed started ”living” on their own. They were subject to approval or criticism, 
enhanced or weakened the opinions of those that they reached. They contributed to 
the creation of a new theoretical and practical quality that, although limited by the 
number of subjects participating in debates, was nevertheless present.  
 
5. Dispute about the origin of public opinion. 
        Some authors undertake efforts aimed at establishing when and in connection 
with what conditions public opinion emerged. Such an unequivocal standpoint can be 
found among those expressed by T. Goban-Klas (1998: 357) ”mass media are not 
necessary for the emergence of public opinion; simpler, interpersonal media are 
sufficient, but the combination of mass and interpersonal media is the most effective 
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one for the emergence of public opinion” -  I must admit that I fully agree with such a 
view.  
    For the supporters of the thesis connected with the existence of general opinion the 
emergence of public opinion is inseparably connected with the introduction of 
technical media into the communication process. Some of the authors believe that 
writing was such a medium whose appearance led to the objectivisation of the process 
of transmission, and especially that of perception. After all, the person who wrote 
something had practically no influence on who will read that text. Other authors 
believe that only the appearance of such electronic carriers as radio, film, television 
introduced fast and truly ‘mass’ media of social communication into the public life 
(in the case of writing this was of a more limited nature).  
    Some of the authors that take part in this discussion try to associate the emergence 
of public opinion with the socio-economic and political development. They believe 
that public opinion appeared when capitalistic production relations were established. 
And the key factor that this new formation introduced was freedom permitting free 
movement of people and, consequently, of opinions. The development of capitalistic 
relations was parallelly accompanied by the development of democracy. Liberalism 
(and in particular the principles of laissez faire) in the economic sphere was 
accompanied by the freedom of speech (”capitalism of print”) and the extension of 
the range of political rights. Schmidt (1993: 148) counted among them ”...open, non-
secret parliamentary debates, general trials, freedom of opinion and press. Following 
the example of England (with its „public opinion government”)...”. The democratic 
mechanism is, after all, inseparably connected with active participation of public 
opinion in the political life.  
      The lack of boundary between opinions that are shaped without the participation 
of technical media and those that are shaped with that participation induces us to seek 
some other ways of delimitation between social and public opinion, or the public and 
general one. Let us collect again the objections presented above. One may ask a 
question as to which medium and at what time caused that the ”opinion among 
people” or the ”general one” became public opinion. Was it the print? The first book? 
Newspaper? Or is it the quantitative factor, that matters, i.e. the dissemination among 
the masses of both books and newspapers? Such an approach makes the problem even 
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more complicated as there arises a question about what quantity determines the 
change of quality. Therefore, trying to break that deadlock that the aforementioned 
proposal regarding differentiation between public and social opinion leads to I 
suggest moving that boundary to the subjective plane. Expressed in that way, public 
opinion would be connected with the articulation of views and communication in 
the field of politics. Whereas everything else that is not, or not yet, political 
would belong to social opinion.  
         Let us return to G. Sartori’s dilemmas regarding the existence, or not, of public 
opinion in repressive political systems, where we deal with opinion among people 
spread only among them and emerging in political systems where an individual is 
treated objectively, and opinion by people emerging in the democratic society. We 
could ask a question whether the United States in the period of the so-called 
”McCarthyism” (1953-1955) ceased to be a democratic state. Was public opinion 
functioning at that time? Similar questions can be asked about Poland. Was Poland 
not, in 1956, in the 1970s or in the second half of the 1980s, and especially during the 
years 1988-89 a totalitarian state? Undoubtedly the United States, in the 
aforementioned period, were a democratic state with the functioning public opinion. 
We can find out about the dilemmas of that period in the United States from 
publications by Samuel Stouffer who based his study mainly on public opinion polls 
regarding the attitude of the American public towards communism, anticommunism 
and civil liberties. A significant supplement are also publications prepared by Paul 
Lazarsfeld who was also engaged in the research of phenomena connected with 
McCarthyism. His studies focused on the attitude of academic circles towards those 
political activities.  
          It should similarly univocally be acknowledged that the political system of the 
Polish People’s Republic had all the theoretical characteristics of a totalitarian state 
(however, in the relevant literature one may encounter opinions in which 
periodisation of the Polish socialism is made using such definitions as semi-
totalitarianism or autocracy). These definitions indicate that the assessment of the 
extent to which Polish People’s Republic system was totalitarian gives rise to 
numerous discussions and major controversies. Those definitions, in particular, 
indicate that there were periods in the history of the Polish People’s Republic in 
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which the operation of totalitarian state mechanisms was considerably limited. 
Undoubtedly one of the major arguments testifying to it was the functioning of public 
opinion. Thus, it is possible to state that public opinion also underwent ‘waving’. 
Between 1945 and 1989 we had periods of its (i.e. public opinion’s) almost entire 
disappearance, through the limitation of the freedom of expression to freedom that 
was practically unlimited. Although the latter arouses more and more numerous 
doubts, especially in the context of media expansion at the end of the 20
th century. 
Therefore criteria applied by G. Sartori, although quite clear-cut, do not (in my 
opinion) entirely clarify the doubts. One should emphasise that any attempts at the 
adoption of an unambiguous interpretation describing the emergence of public 
opinion and conditions of its functioning would be extremely difficult. It seems that 
the process is much more complicated and requires numerous factors to be considered 
by those who deal with the theory of public opinion.  
      At the same time no one has specified what the minimum level or quantity of 
individual articulated views is that can be referred to as constituting public opinion. I 
entirely support the standpoint of A. Gramsci who writes that ”of course elements of 
public opinion were always present, even in Asian satrapies, but public opinion as we 
understand it now has come into existence on the eve of the fall of absolute 
monarchies, in the period of new bourgeoisie class struggling for political hegemony 
and power” (Gramsci). Above, we have also raised a problem where (among others) 
G. Sartori deemed media to be the major factor creating public opinion. We will 
rather assume that all the examples of behaviour in the field of politics adopted 
by the governed that consist in the expression of attitude towards the 
government will constitute an expression of public opinion – both the verbal and 
non-verbal ones, including the use of technical media. What is also important, 
taking into consideration a factor connected with the subjectivity of individuals, 
groups and institutions, is the authenticity – sovereignty (as the authors of one of the 
definitions emphasise) of the articulation of opinions. That is why the definition takes 
account of the issue of sovereignty, as well as the necessity of articulation.  
        The fact of the totalitarian state taking control over all the media and the lack of 
democratic mechanisms (mainly elections) seems to be the key factor stimulating the 
public behaviour. The level of criticism contained in the opinions expressed by 
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citizens is inversely proportional to the degree of the system’s repressive ness. The 
government used to frequently indicate the ”topics” on which criticism was 
permissible, and those on which it was not. It seems that the channel through which 
that information reached the society was the censorship that did it by means of the so-
called ”censorship records”. Looking at the Polish political arena one could draw 
conclusions as to which names and topics were put ”on the Index”, and which were 
released.  
        While totalitarianism constitutes a significant barrier in the free formulation 
and expression of public opinion, democracy enables an optimum development of this 
sphere of political life. Factors that limit that development are weaknesses 
(deficiencies) of democratic mechanisms, or conscious manipulations that happen to 
take place in various areas of political systems, including democratic ones as well.   
    This is the opinion shared by Michel Foucault who attributes a destructive role in 
the confrontation with, among other things, public opinion to the government. He 
believes that the society does not control the state by means of public opinion. To his 
mind it is the government that is the major subject of the society subjugation, which is 
done by means of disciplining measures or manipulations connected, among others, 
with instrumental use of opinion polling results or individual behaviour. Public 
opinion and civic society, on the other hand, are reduced to the sphere of power, self-
disciplining techniques and certain strategies, which questions the meaning or essence 
of those two areas of societies’ functioning. 
 
6. Public opinion or public opinions? 
     Let us ask ourselves next questions. Is public opinion a phenomenon that is ”...an 
element of one debate aiming at a common conclusion” (Ch.Tylor 1996: 25)? How 
should we interpret the problem of public opinion scattering and its pluralistic nature? 
Shall we treat the views of citizens accepting a budgetary act as public opinion or as a 
view that constitutes only a part of public opinion, whereas the remaining space 
would be filled with different standpoints, from partial criticism to total negation? 
Bearing in mind that political issues can never lead to 100% uniformity of views in a 
large community, public opinion would be of pluralistic nature. In that case the 
sentence: Public opinion supports the draft budgetary act... would be incorrect. The 
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correct evaluation of public opinion would be expressed by the following sentence: 
The predominant standpoint within public opinion is the support for that act.    
   Another of the indicated problems refers to the division of opinion in the society 
into two phases. If we assume that the essence of the process of public opinion 
shaping is the exchange of views between the members of the ”authorities’ 
performance” audience, then we should be consistent. Evaluation of political 
authority, or its particular actions, e.g. in the Middle Ages, was based on the opinions 
that appeared in various circles. There is no doubt that those who participated in such 
a debate were relatively few (compared to the present day), but no author uses the 
quantitative factor as an argument in the discussion depreciating public opinion. 
Nowadays, in some countries, public opinion (in terms of quantity) is relatively not 
bigger than that from the remotest past. This fact does not lead to the negation of 
public opinion existence, either. If it is not the quantitative factor that is a problem 
here, then maybe it is a qualitative one. The authors mentioned above put forward an 
argument relating to the quality of discussions held within the framework of public 
opinion shaping. Inclusion of the problem of discussion quality in the criteria makes 
that point of reference even more moving. 
 
7. Public opinion vs. political consciousness. 
In this connection a problem of relation between the concepts of public opinion and 
political consciousness arises, unless we assume that consciousness is only an 
intellectual factor, whereas concealed public opinion constitutes a concept similar to 
attitude, containing - apart from the intellectual factor - also an affective and 
behavioural element.  
      The relationship between social consciousness and social opinion consists in the 
fact that those two concepts potentially have a common part, namely the object of 
interests. Potentially, because social opinion will cover only those issues that 
constitute an object of controversy. In either case it objectively covers all the issues 
that come within the spectrum of human interest. Therefore public opinion forms a 
part of social opinion just like political consciousness forms a part of social 
consciousness, whereas the relationship between opinion and consciousness is the 
same as the one between theory and practice. Opinion may be an expression of 
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consciousness (although it does not have to) whereas individually, at the same time, 
no reverse relationship occurs. 
      The above remarks induce us to take a look at public opinion development from a 
certain perspective. Therefore assuming that the development of such a phenomenon 
as public opinion is of historical nature, we can distinguish: 
1. Prehistorical period – that was connected with the emergence of political 
authority and, consequently, the opinion on its functioning.  
2. Ancient period that covers the time when the exchange of goods, conquests as 
well as the development of political mechanisms (among others that of democracy 
and, consequently, of public debate) undoubtedly contributed to the making of views 
and opinions public.  
3. Middle Ages and Renaissance when a significant step in the process of public 
opinion shaping was the appearance of wide-spread common religions (combining 
sacrum and profanum), again – democratic institutions (parliament), urban 
development as well as invention and development of printing. 
 4. Period of revolutions and reforms that characterises the societies’ taking the 
direct path towards capitalism and, consequently, the appearance of the idea of 
”sovereignty of people”, further development of parliamentarism, secularisation of 
authorities, considerable migration movements (connected with the development of 
colonialism), as well as dissemination of an important communication medium, 
namely the newspaper.  
5. Industrial period (beginning in the middle of the 19
th century) means universality 
of parliamentary forms, extension of electoral rights, emergence of mass movements 
and political parties, appearance of railways, automobiles, steamers, telegraph and 
telephone, dissemination of education.  
6. Post-industrial period that has the following characteristics: dynamism of 
political and economic changes in the 20
th century, especially the quantitative and 
qualitative development of countries; mass appearance of general elections, 
referenda, as well as principles based on parliamentarism and democracy that have 
become a political standard; appearance of radio, television, Internet and satellite 
communication.  
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    The public market has been taking its form since the time when authority other 
than that resulting from family ties only appeared in human relationships. In the 
course of transformation of social, economic and political relationships this market 
has been developing and improving. 
 
II. Polish public opinion 1989-1999 and NATO. 
      I  believe  that  while  trying  to  describe this relationship one should divide the 
decade of 1990s into two periods. The first period would cover the years 1989-1993 
when Poland was still a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, while even after 
the formal break-up of that alliance soldiers of the Soviet Army were stationed within 
the territory of Poland. The second period comprises Poland’s joining the programme 
”Partnership for Peace”, and also the dissemination of a conviction in the society and 
within the major political forces that the strategic goal of the Polish foreign policy, 
society and state is Poland’s membership in NATO.  
 
1.  Poland leaves the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.   
     Agreements that were reached at the ”Round Table” provided for an evolutionary 
nature of political changes that Poland was to undergo. One agreed to the 
transformation process being spread over the years, mainly due to the fact of Poland’s 
presence in the economic structures of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and the 
military ones of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It was never expected after the 
victory of the ”Solidarity” that the entire political situation both in Poland and in the 
Central and Eastern Europe would undergo such a radicalisation and acceleration.  
   Already in August 1989 the Government of Romania proposed that the member 
states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation should hold out a ”brotherly hand” to 
Poland. During the visit of Michail Gorbachev to Bonn in July 1989 Helmut Kohl 
said that ”the key problem of European safety remains a considerable supremacy of 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in conventional armaments. Whereas that problem 
should be solved by the reduction thereof.” At the end of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Aid meeting held in January 1989 in Vienna 23 countries being the 
members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO signed a document in which 
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it was established that disarmament negotiations would be initiated in March in 
Vienna. In February 1989 the Warsaw Treaty Organisation revealed, for the first 
time, the information on its weapons. It turned out that the countries of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation had 7,233 thousand soldiers at their disposal (of which the USSR 
had 2.5 million soldiers up to Ural Mountains). The important thing in 1989, from the 
point of view of future relations with NATO, was the fact that those who spoke 
before the NATO’s Eastern Europe Committee were Polish parliamentarians. That 
contact was largely communicated and commented upon also by the Polish press, as 
this visit was of a symbolic nature then and initiated a journey ended in 1999.  
      The  first  ministerial  meeting  was held in March 1990 during the visit of the 
minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski to 
NATO Headquarters. Further contacts were a consequence of the historic London 
declaration made at the meeting of the heads of NATO countries and governments on 
5-6 July 1990. It proposed ”the creation of partnership relations” through the 
establishment of direct contacts and the political dialogue, as well as through the 
development of military co-operation aimed at the enhancement of stability in Europe 
as a whole. Regular contacts were established in August 1990, whereas in September 
that year Manfred Woerner, Secretary-General of NATO visited Poland. Dissolution 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (July 
1991) did not prompt NATO leaders to present greater readiness or political will to 
treat the proposal regarding admission of new countries seriously. The response to 
Polish suggestions were non-committal answers that did not preclude any future 
option. Therefore, similarly to Tadeusz Mazowicki’s government, also the Cabinet of 
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki did not officially regard NATO membership as a real political 
goal, although the conviction about the necessity of joining NATO was constantly 
growing, both within the Polish elite and the society. Among the Polish political class 
one may distinguish two major options: representatives of the right wing (e.g. Centre 
Alliance) loudly demanded, both domestically and in their contacts with West-
European politicians, that Poland be admitted to NATO. Representatives of the 
Centre, on the other hand, (e.g. Democratic Union) took a realistic stand accepting 
conditions that the Western Europe was guided by. Some parties, e.g. Labour Union, 
shared the opinions of the Centre, while postcommunist parties were at that time 
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readjusting their views on the issue of alliances (having numerous reservations as to 
our membership in that Organisation). 
        One should state that the society, functioning within the framework of a socialist 
system, while expressing its opinions on the international situation was frequently 
influenced by the contemporary propaganda. Numerous examples can be found to 
confirm the thesis about the existence of the so-called ”false consciousness” 
presented by Polish public opinion. The above can be attested to by the table 1. 
below. 
Data published relating to the actual size and quality of armaments in both 
blocs would indicate that the conviction about NATO’s supremacy was erroneous or 
at least relative. Those convictions, to a large extent, determined opinions formulated 
by the respondents in that period while expressing their attitude towards NATO and 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.  
 
                                 On whose side is the military supremacy? (%) 
 
No. 
 
                             Answers  VI 
1988 
XII 
1989 
VI 
1990 
1  both organisations are more or less equally powerful  43  32  35 
2  on the side of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
armed forces 
 
7 
 
10 
 
8 
3  on the side of  NATO armed forces  16 19 29 
4  difficult to say  34 39 28 
Table 1. OBOP  June 1990 
 
          In September 1990 CBOS asked a question relating to, among other things, 
the thirteen elements that, in the respondents’ opinion, would be decisive of the 
Poland’s “return to Europe”. Those elements included the observance of civil rights, 
convertibility of Polish zloty, democratic elections, ability to leave the country, etc. In 
this set of issues the following were also present: Poland’s resignation from the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation membership (38,9% of indications, 12
th  place in the 
ranking) and Accession to NATO (21% of indications and 13
th place – the last one). 
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What is important is that issues placed at the top of the ranking received over 80% of 
indications. This makes us see the importance of those problems for the contemporary 
society. Taking the opportunity one may indicate that from among social and 
demographic features that affected the opinions connected with the “Return to 
Europe” and consequently accession to NATO, two turned out to be of particular 
importance, namely gender and wealth. Our joining NATO was of much less 
importance to women than it was to men. Rise in income also increased the degree of 
acceptance: from 31,6% when declaring that the income is “the lowest” to 52,0% 
when it is “the highest”. It should repeatedly be emphasised that at that time the vast 
proportion of Polish public opinion did not as yet show particular interest in the 
problem of integration with NATO and the European Union.  
     If we were to indicate which element, from among the factors connected with 
safety and changes in the military sphere, was the most significant one to public 
opinion in Poland, then it would be the Red Army. It was its presence that could 
already at that time significantly affect the attitudes of Poles. In the report on research 
announced by CBOS in April 1990 it can be noticed that 43% of respondents would 
be ”always pleased” to hear about the retreat of Soviet army from Poland, 19% 
responded to the ‘idea’: “with discontent”, whereas 37,5% could not unequivocally 
describe their feelings. During that same research 61% of Poles, just like in previous 
years, said that Poland should remain in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.  
        When [...] should the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Poland? (%)  
  
 
 
No. 
           
            Answers 
Supporters of the 
dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation  
Opponents of the 
dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty  Organisation 
1 Immediately                    73                  60 
2  After the retreat of 
 troops from Germany 
                   
                   18 
                
                 23 
3  I am against the retreat                     17                     7 
4  Difficult to say                     7                   10 
Table 2. CBOS March 1991 
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 Simultaneously it was a period when the “transformation of consciousness” began 
and therefore, among others, the number of people perceiving the USSR as an ally 
began then to drop significantly. Confirmation of those trends can be found in the 
answers that were given to the following question(Table 2). 
 
Also in March 1991 OBOP, for the first time, touched the subject of the 
Treaty Organisation’s liquidation asking respondents a question as to whether “The 
liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation structures is favourable for Poland or 
not.” As many as 57% of respondents believed that it would be favourable for Poland, 
whereas 20% said that it would be unfavourable. Similar number of respondents, i.e. 
23% were unable to take a univocal stand and replied that it was “difficult to say”. It 
has to be indicated, though, that the highest number of supporters of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation’s dissolution was among people with university education (75%), 
whereas among people with elementary education this group constituted 52%, and 
among those with basic vocational education - 51%. At the same time a question was 
also asked whether the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation would increase 
the safety or not. The number of respondents who believed that it would increase the 
level of safety amounted to 19%, while 37% were of the opinion that it would 
decrease the safety, and 29% of respondents said that the level of safety would remain 
unchanged (19% had no clear opinion on that matter). Similar question was asked of 
Poles by CBOS in March 1991 during research that we have already analysed. In this 
case the degree of certainty turned out to be even higher. When asked: “Should the  
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
Poland should be: 
60%
31%
5%
4%
neutral
another answer
in alliance with the West
in alliance with the USSR
 
Illustration 1. CBOS March 1991 
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  Warsaw Treaty Organisation be liquidated?”, as many as 64% of respondents gave 
an affirmative answer. 26% said that the Treaty Organisation should continue its  
Questions that are asked of respondents gain new aspects when they are preceded by 
questions of a basic nature. In May 1992 CBOS asked a question as to what kind of 
an organisation NATO was. Respondents had three answers to choose from: “an 
international economic association”, ”military alliance” and “one of the institutions 
subordinated to the United Nations Organisation”. Two-thirds of the respondents 
identified NATO correctly.  
      Questions also began to appear that placed NATO as our ally or even depicted 
Poland as a country integrated with the Alliance. When asked “What policy is 
currently [...] the most favourable one in order to ensure Poland’s safety”, 35% 
respondents answered that it was an alliance with NATO, 35% were of the opinion 
that we should not enter into any alliance, whereas 9% of respondents were for 
alliances with individual countries and 20% had no explicit opinions on that matter. 
Public opinion polls became present also in newspapers and weekly magazines. The 
most frequent ones were single questions that were supposed to reveal public 
opinions on a given subject. Such an opinion poll was published in Gazeta Wyborcza. 
Respondents were asked a question: “Should Poland strive for the membership in 
NATO?” In this case as many as 77% of respondents gave an affirmative answer to 
that question whereas only 10% were against that option (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
31.03.1992). This result however may raise certain objections due to the fact that 
Gazeta Wyborcza did not give any information as to: Who conducted the poll? On 
what sample? Using what technique? The only guarantee of the presented data 
reliability can be the ”publisher’s reputation”. It seems, however, that the results find 
their confirmation in OBOP research that already in 1992 asked a question connected 
with Polish NATO-related aspirations (Table 3). In this case, from the very beginning 
the respondents expressed a firm standpoint with respect to our political aspirations. 
As it can be seen in the table below, the tendency in the years 1992-1995 was rather 
steady – the results indicate that the support for NATO accession is expressed by over 
three-fourths of the population. 
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In the case of this research the strongest pro-NATO tendencies are again 
connected with the level of education and the age: the younger the person and the 
higher the education, the strongest the will to join NATO.  
 
           Do you agree that Poland should strive for NATO membership? (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Indications by dates of polls   
No. 
 
Answer         III. ‘92       X. ‘93       II. ‘94   VI-VII 95 
  1.  Definitely yes     30    38    39    38 
  2.   Rather yes     47 
 
  77    43 
 
  81    40 
 
  79    38 
 
  76 
  3.    Rather no      7     5     5     9 
  4.  Definitely no      3 
 
   10     2 
 
   7     2 
 
   7     3 
 
  11 
  5.  Difficult to say             13           12             14           12 
Table 3. OBOP March 1999 
Politicians of that period were more and more willingly discussing the issue of 
Poland joining (or not) NATO. Particular publicity (mainly on account of the person) 
was given to the proposal of Lech Wałęsa, the then President of the Republic of 
Poland. He presented an idea of forming “NATO-bis”. This proposal consisted in 
organising Central and Eastern European countries in an association under the 
auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This association would gather 
countries of the region awaiting their admission to (the real) NATO. Within the 
framework of NATO-bis military forces would be organised, based on those 
countries, that would be able to counteract conflicts in that region. The proposal, apart 
from numerous press publications, did not raise any practical interest among 
“respectable politicians”. Let the comment be an opinion expressed by Prof. Jadwiga 
Staniszkis who, in an interview for Tygodnik Solidarność, said that the election of 
Bill Clinton to be the President of the United States was more favourable for Poland 
than the election of George Bush who was a supporter of treating the Central 
European countries as a buffer between NATO and the countries that emerged after 
the break-up of the USSR (including Russia in particular). Prof. J. Staniszkis 
commented upon that “buffer” idea in the following way: “[...] They tried to exert 
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influence on the defence and foreign policy, the example of which is Belvedere 
concept of NATO-bis, a naive conception of buffer idea [..] This is going to end now. 
Clinton’s adviser for Eastern Europe is the Czech, Madeline Albright - the disciple of 
Zbigniew Brzeziński. She wrote a book on Poland in which she largely criticised the 
idea of Poland as a buffer zone”. 
        One of the aspects of public opinion perception of the Polish army was the 
problem connected with the introduction of civil control over the forces. The 
resistance of many officers, and in particular that of the staff of generals in relation to 
“laymen – civilians” was also used by the politicians. Some perceived the staff of 
officers almost as a postcommunist “inheritance” that cannot be changed in any way. 
Others, by manipulating the feelings expressed by officers, tried to present 
themselves as defenders of the army’s autonomy against the attempts of civilians. 
Alliances that were formed on that occasion frequently ran across political 
formations. As an exemplification of those options let us quote statements that were 
characteristic of the two options. J. Kaczyński, the representative of the former one 
believed that there were forces in Belvedere whose aim was “to maintain and protect 
communist systems in the army, make relationship with NATO difficult in order to be 
able then to form a joint commanding staff of postsocialist states’ armies” (Tygodnik 
Solidarność II). The latter point of view finds its reflection in the statements of the 
then Minister of National Defence, Mr. P. Kołodziejczyk. When asked, in an 
interview that was published in the weekly magazine entitled Wprost, “What do you 
think about politicians who demand the quickest possible accession to NATO” he said 
that “They do not understand that nobody can fit a square peg to the round hole. We 
are not an equal partner for NATO and we cannot afford to become one soon.” Those 
political options reflected, in a sense, public opinion views on the pace and the 
accession process itself. The number of those who were in favour of Poland joining 
NATO was systematically growing while the opponents of that idea among 
politicians were becoming fewer and fewer. The thing that caused many disputes 
within the political class in relation to this subject was the pace of that integration.  
       But also in this matter the difference of opinion was becoming less and less 
visible. One may presume that politicians adapted themselves to the public opinion 
views, because otherwise their situation would be very difficult, all the more so as 
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1993 was the year of elections. This situation concerns especially the left wing that 
had a chance to take over. Its leaders were aware that they could not ignore the 
growing support for the idea of Poland’s accession to NATO. Because there is no 
doubt that still as late as in the autumn 1993 the left wing electorate’s approval of our 
membership in NATO was much lower than that of people who declared to have 
right-wing views (although taking the Polish political scene into consideration the 
very declaration of having “left-wing” or “right-wing” views may not be entirely 
credible).  
What policy is currently the most favourable one in order 
to ensure Poland’s safety? (%) 
                     Views declared  The most favourable 
policy for         
Poland’s safety is 
   left-wing      centrist   left-wing  undefined 
Neutrality        18          12         10        15 
Accession to NATO        61          63         73        39 
Other alliances        13          12          9         8 
Difficult to say         8         13          8        38 
 
     Table 4. CBOS August 1993 
 
As it can be seen the differences are not significant, but nevertheless noticeable. A 
confirmation of opinions gathered can also constitute answers to the question on what 
could ensure Poland’s safety.  
         One  may  say  that  it  is  an  ‘indirect’  declaration  indicating  the  pro-NATO 
nature of the opinions presented above. This results from the fact that in that period 
there was no other important military structure (after the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation) that Poland could integrate with. And the formation of other 
organisations was impossible, which the history of “NATO-bis” idea (as mentioned 
above) only confirms.  
     One could ask a question whether the motive of pro-NATO declarations is the 
true sympathy or political calculation. Searching for answers to this question one 
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should take a look at the attitude of Poles towards individual (or at least major) 
countries that are members of NATO. Undoubtedly the key position is taken here by 
Germany. And in this case one can see that declarations of ”affection” for a part do 
not forejudge emotions regarding the whole. Despite undoubtedly numerous efforts 
and geopolitical changes the attitude of Poles towards the Germans could in 1993 be 
described as characterised by a good deal of scepticism, distrust or hostility. What 
proves the above are declarations of Poles made while answering the question: ”Do 
you believe that as a result of the unification of Germany the situation of Poland has, 
generally speaking: improved?” 19%  answered yes, whereas 31% said that “the 
situation has remained unchanged”. The most significant percentage, however, are 
those who maintain that the situation of Poland and Poles ”has deteriorated” – 39% 
(CBOS September 1993). One should add that similar figures were achieved in 1992, 
so it seems that opinions became stabilised.  
         Analysing the results of opinion polls one may notice a highly significant fact, 
namely that the more approving attitude is connected with the education. The higher 
its level, the fewer stereotypes, myths, phobias, etc. Differences are significant and 
amount to around 20% between the declarations made by people with elementary and 
university education. As one can see Poles did not trust politicians. Political 
experiences of the past 200 years at least partially justify that scepticism. One should 
say that the flow of time had rather increased that distrust because a similar question 
asked in 1994 (CBOS - February) brought as many as 57% of affirmative answers to 
the question: “Is it possible that NATO countries agree with Russia about Poland 
behind its back?”. Friendly attitude towards the West was that time assumed by 19% 
of respondents. Similarly sceptical opinions were expressed by the respondents in 
1993 with respect to a guarantee that in the case of threat to our independence NATO 
countries “will not come to our aid” – that view was shared by 47% of respondents. 
Only 4% believed that the West will surely come to our aid, while 25% answered 
“rather yes” (CBOS November 1993). Figures similar to those from 1993 were 
achieved in 1995 (CBOS January 1995); Polish public opinion was still rather 
cautious with respect to the possibility of NATO aid. When asked “Do you think that 
if Russia aims at the subordination of Poland, Poland can count on Western countries 
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aid or not?”, 42% of respondents answered “No” whereas 36% were inclined to trust 
Western partners, saying “Yes” (22% had no opinion).  
Generally speaking, has the situation of Poland as a 
result of the unification of Germany:
11
17
44
28
11
39
31
19
11
36
34
19
Serie3
Serie2
Serie1
  May-92
June-93
June-94
deteriorated
difficult to say
improved
remained 
unchanged
 
   Illustration 2. CBOS September 94 
   
This threat is perceived mainly to be posed by Russia, but also Germany 
(especially after unification). In the case of Germany it seems that the fear is 
connected with the economic domination (expansion) rather than the military one. 
One was aware of the economic power that Germany had been before 1990, whereas 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall brought about the situation in which we became a 
neighbour of the country that dominated not only in terms of economy, but also 
population and territory. When in the course of two years it turned out that it had no 
negative consequences, the situation occasioned an evolution of public opinion, 
which became visible already in 1994. The fact that proportions in the estimation of 
threats to our independence changed can be ascertained when we take a look at the 
Illustration 3.  
          One can say that threats to our independence are increasingly noticed rather in 
the East than in the West. Among external threats the most frequently mentioned ones 
were those posed by Russia and the former USSR countries (as many as 48% of 
indications). Such an attitude resulted, among other things, from the fact that, firstly, 
the situation in the East was still unpredictable. Secondly, Russia - in particular - had 
begun to display the so-called ”power tendencies” (openly opposing, among others, the 
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intention of admitting former Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries to NATO). 
Thirdly, in the political consciousness of Poles there is a stereotype (determined by 
  historical experience) connected with Russia, but also certain political realism: 
participation in the annexation of Polish territory for over 130 years, as well as 
experiences relating to the period of Polish-Soviet war, or, finally, those from World 
War II. It is no secret that the preservation of socialist regimes was possible only with 
the political and military control by the Red Army and Soviet politicians.  
          One has to acknowledge that mutual relationships of Poland and NATO 
(before we joined that organisation) were strongly determined by our relationship 
with Russia, which found its full reflection in public opinion. However, certain 
differences in perceiving the position of Russia, and particularly the way it should be 
treated, did occur. They resolved themselves mainly into the level of radicalism 
between political class (that showed greater conservatism) and public opinion. 
Russian was (and still largely is) perceived mainly through its power aspirations, 
which manifested itself, among other things, in the fact that in political, economic, 
military (which the war in Chechnya proved) and civilisation terms Russia 
endeavoured to restore the ethos that already was a substitute of ”magnificence 
gone”.  Russia had lost its position on the international scene. This situation resulted 
in its becoming a very difficult partner in international relationships. Hence the 
occasional spectacular gestures that were supposed to show the international 
community ”that this bear is not toothless, hairless and sick, but is still able to bite 
What kind of relationship is Russia anxious to establish with Poland?
14%
15%
8%
63%
1
2
3
4
Such as would subordinate interests of 
Poland to the interests of Russia.
Relationship with Poland is of little 
importance to Russia.
Difficult to say
Relationship with Poland that is 
good and based on equal rights
Illustration 3. CBOS January 1995    
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and hit with his paw”. Adding to this picture the lack of coherence in the field 
of foreign policy of Russia and unconventional personalities of Russian politicians 
these elements present a picture of the situation that emerged at the beginning of the 
1990s. Let us see how Polish public opinion perceived the determinants of Polish – 
Russian relationship. Symptomatic is the fact that the highest percentage is that of 
people who believe that the reason of Russia’s objection (as to our accession to 
NATO) is the wish to rebuild its former sphere of influence in Poland. Such a stand 
(as it is evident from Illustration 4) is taken by people with university education, as 
well as those who declare much interest in politics. Thus, the increase of competence 
among the public results in the increase of criticism. Such a thesis has to prompt 
another reflection of a more general nature, namely that the approval of politicians’ 
activities would result, in a sense, from unawareness and ignorance (?!). On the  
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Illustration 4. CBOS January 1995   
whole, this opinion is accepted, while the difference between the developed democracy 
and the one ”still in its infancy” consists in the fact that in the former the prevailing 
voice of public opinion determines political choices made. 
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2. Poland in “Partnership for Peace” programme. 
A.  Poles on their way to NATO 
         The  discussion  that  was  held  both in Poland and on the international scene 
relating to the possibility of NATO enlargement took another shape upon the 
introduction and implementation of the programme called “Partnership for Peace”. 
Politicians as well as public opinion began noticing that the perspective of integration 
was not only a media element, but a real one, too. It found its reflection in the degree of 
support given by the society to the idea of integration with NATO. In 1994 two major 
Polish polling institutes, i.e. CBOS and OBOP conducted opinion polls asking direct 
questions to the respondents: “Should Poland aim at the accession to NATO?” (OBOP 
March 1994). The second institute, CBOS (July 1994) asked the following question: ”If 
referendum was held in Poland on the accession of Poland to NATO, would you 
vote?”. Univocal nature of questions and an answer composed of three variants allows 
us to compare that material, which in the author’s opinion confirms the credibility of 
results achieved.  
                 Level of approval for the idea of Poland joining NATO. (%)  
           Table 5.  
 
No. 
 
 Name of the institute and the wording of the 
question 
Yes 
(For) 
No 
(Against) 
Difficult  
to say 
 
1 
Should Poland aim at the accession to NATO 
(OBOP March 1994) 
   
     79     
 
      7 
      
      14 
 
2 
 
If referendum was held in Poland on the 
accession of Poland to NATO, would you vote 
(CBOS BS 120/106. July 1994) 
 
     75 
 
     10 
 
       15 
 
        One could say that the degree of determination within public opinion did not 
give important politicians any chance to contest that option. Therefore, especially 
within the left wing, voices that questioned the purposefulness of Polish aspirations 
had considerably died out. Although opinions similar to those of Prof. Stanisław 
Ehrlich still continued to appear: “No French or American soldier will fight for 
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Białystok or Przemyśl - at the very most they can do business there. We have an 
opportunity of acquiring the status of a neutral state.” (Wprost 1994). Only some of 
the political class did at that time the so-called ”thinking aloud” connected with 
possibilities (including the time-related ones, i.e. a probable date of NATO accession) 
and adaptation of Polish Army to that operation. As it can be inferred from the 
example above, the comparison of results achieved by both polling institutes only 
confirms the firm attitudes predominant within public opinion. Questions that were 
asked frequently had a different level of generality. Some of them, however, required 
the respondents to make a very univocal declaration – one had to take a decision. The 
degree of determination as to the support for pro-NATO aspirations was measured in 
subsequent years as well, using the “referendum” question quoted above. Thus, it was 
possible to make a comparison allowing, and reliably so, to make a thorough analysis 
of public opinion of that time. Since 1994 the percentage of people supporting the idea 
of Poland joining NATO has not dropped below 75%. 
 
                   Should referendum be held in Poland on the accession of Poland to 
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Illustration 5. CBOS - BS 90/90. July 1997 
 
       Similar  question  was  asked  of  respondents by Marketing Research Centre 
INDICATOR (Rzeczpospolita 1998). As for those who would oppose our joining 
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NATO while taking part in the referendum, that group reached 10%, which was 
similar to the results achieved by CBOS in its research. Significant differences related 
to the number of undecided people - 26%. That difference, by the force of events, had 
to influence the group that would vote for the accession to NATO: it amounted to 
64%. That research was conducted in May 1998 on a random sample of 979 people, 
which is the minimum provided by opinion polling standards.  
          Public opinion polls, however, indicate a decided political will to join NATO 
presented by a considerable part of the society. Discrepancies regarding the level of 
support concern the period of 1990-1992. As it has already been emphasised, fully 
comparable data from various polling institutes are difficult to be achieved, but taking 
into consideration the merits of the questions as well as several objections it turns out 
that there are certain possibilities of making a comparison. Results that have been 
achieved by CBOS and OBOP since 1994 do not raise any fundamental 
methodological doubts and seem to be comparable (at least internally). It follows 
from them that the support for NATO remained at the level of 70 -85%. It was only 
on the eve of joining NATO that declining tendencies appeared, when the issue of 
integration with the Alliance had already formally been settled. At the same time 
Poland’s membership in NATO gains less support when the respondents make 
themselves aware of various consequences of that step. As of 1997 the percentage of 
respondents supporting the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had 
begun to decrease, reaching 65% at the beginning of 1999. The next growing 
tendency, in turn, is connected with NATO intervention in Yugoslavia (?!).  
        Trying to identify the reasons of those declining tendencies one should take 
numerous factors into consideration, without limiting oneself to the rational ones 
only. The major factor is undoubtedly the Balkan conflict that aroused controversies 
among the public. The second factor, in my opinion, is the psychological one. As long 
as the perspective of joining NATO was of a hypothetical nature, support was not 
connected with any responsibility; when the perspective started to become reality the 
enthusiasm may have been quenched. That decrease resulted in a fact that on 6-8 
February 1999 the support amounted to 63%, while polls repeated two weeks later 
gave the result of 67% (OBOP[1] March 1999). Let me remind you that in March 
1999 the support for Poland joining NATO was expressed by 60% of those 
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questioned (CBOS 35/99 March 1999). As you can see the results are similar, but 
considerably lower than those achieved in the years 1993-98. This is connected firstly 
with the Balkan campaign, and secondly with some of the society becoming aware 
that NATO membership means certain profits, but also specific conditions and 
obligations whose fulfilment would be monitored by the allies from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The major verifying element of ”the level of optimism”, 
however, seems to be the Balkan conflict. 
        In certain periods public opinion polling institutes asked respondents the same 
questions. Owing to this, nowadays we have an opportunity to make a thorough study 
of the views expressed by Polish society, and their evolution within public opinion. 
Having at one’s disposal data that are the results of opinion polls one can make 
comparative analyses that give the most interesting results. One may also find out 
what the facts that cause a given public opinion waving really are.    
         The aim of Poland’s membership in NATO, apart from factors connected with 
the satisfaction of Poles’ aspirations and their sense of being a member of the 
“Western Civilisation”, was mainly political. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
membership was supposed to provide Poles with a feeling of safety, whereas NATO 
was to gain an important ally, thus extending the area that would become 
“predictable”. At the same time it was assumed that NATO membership would 
minimise the risk connected with a given country becoming involved in an internal or 
external conflict. A circumstance that was usually not articulated, but constituted an 
important element of public opinion in postsocialist states was fear of attempts at the 
restoration of political influence by Russia. The reasons of such an attitude were, 
among other things, loud protests coming from Moscow relating to any activities 
aimed at enlarging NATO by the inclusion of former socialist states’ territories. We 
have presented the anxiety of Polish society using the results of opinion polls, and we 
will resume discussing them in the following subsection.  
 
   B.  Poles strengthen in themselves the feeling of safety. 
All and any discussions relating to NATO, in particular the wish expressed by Poland 
and Poles to become a part of the Alliance, or the participation in ”Partnership for 
Peace” programme are inseparably connected with the feeling of safety. This value, 
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that every politician has to reckon with, has become a major motivating factor to take 
such a keen interest in the integration with political structures of the Western 
countries. Poland, for geo-political and historical reasons, had to seek allies, whereas 
NATO is a political formation that can and even (according to Poles) should guarantee 
such safety.  
          The first period of transition was characterised by a strong feeling of threat 
(See the Illustration). The intersection of ”fear” and ”hope” lines in 1992 gave rise to a 
steady tendency, despite noticeable “swings” that can sometimes be occasioned by 
some quite spectacular event, as for example terrorist attacks that take place during the 
research and, in addition, in a certain proximity to respondents. If at the beginning of 
the 1990s NATO was of no fundamental importance especially to the feeling of 
external safety, then as of 1994 it has surely become a part of this process. This thesis 
arises from the fact that NATO countries separated themselves from any attempted 
suggestions about the possibility of becoming a guarantee of safety for Poland and 
other countries of the region. And the results of polls indicate that the major part of   
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 Illustration 6.   CBOS - BS 107/107.  September 1997 
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public opinion was aware of that fact. Since March 1999 that participation in safety 
guarantees is unquestionable and undoubtedly constitutes a warranty that such a 
tendency shall keep up, simultaneously hoping that NATO will not be forced to prove 
it.    
 It is generally impossible for the opinion polls to univocally determine the 
elements that influence the structure of changes of public opinion. We can usually 
draw some more or less probable conclusions based on the indications of respondents 
or our knowledge of circumstances in which the poll was conducted. If opinion poll on  
the functioning of administration was taken both in stable and extreme circumstances, 
then one could frequently obtain some entirely different results. If it had been 
conducted in Wrocław in August, right after the flood when the major part of the city 
was under water, then analysing the responses without that piece of information we 
could draw some not entirely accurate conclusions. Therefore this feeling of safety is a 
result of many factors, both of internal and external nature. When we strive to 
determine, for instance, what makes us feel threatened, then we usually try to find a 
single source that evokes such a feeling. This particular regularity is also known by 
politicians who sometimes manage to set that mechanism in motion. It is food for 
various political extremisms that offer public opinion some simple recipes. Antidotes 
against threats or lack of feeling of safety are arguments of racial, ethnic, religious, 
ideological, etc. nature. As it has already been mentioned the process of various social 
groups and the society as a whole becoming convinced that our (i.e. Poland’s and 
Poles’) aim is the integration with NATO was spread over a certain period of time.  
However, already since 1993 a conviction has been established in the political 
consciousness of Poles that the most effective means of becoming safe is striving for 
NATO membership. When in 1993 ”that idea” exceeded 50% of its supporters the 
percentage of people approving such a course of action has not dropped below 60% 
ever since. Let us take a look at the diagram above (Illustration 7).  
This summary presentation depicts how this univocal opinion began to 
dominate within Polish public opinion after 1993. The public opinion waving that has 
already been mentioned showed only slight differences. Amplitude in the answers 
within individual ”questions” was rather insignificant and if present at all, it usually 
had a specific tendency (growing or declining one). Undoubtedly the most impressive 
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to look at in the diagram is the increase of public opinion support for the ideas of 
“increasing safety through the admission of Poland to NATO”. Analysing the 
specified parameters, such as age, gender or political views one may observe that - 
taking account of those attributes - a similar differentiation of judgements took place. 
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There also appeared certain tendency that was connected first of all with age. 
Within the group aged 24 or less the rate of support amounted to as much as 84%, 
whereas among people aged 65 plus it amounted to 61%. That comparison is even 
more striking when we take the profession of respondents into account. In the group of 
students the rate of support amounted to as much as 93%, whereas among pensioners 
it amounted to only 62%. It might be slightly surprising to find out that political 
affiliation to the left or the right wing resulted in a difference of only 7 points.  
Those issues contributed to the fact that the assessment of profit and loss 
balance changed. As it can be seen in the diagram below opinions formulated while 
discussing chart no. 5 find more than just their confirmation, whereas questions that 
were asked of respondents do not raise any doubts as to what the main reason of the 
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change in views on the effects of integration with NATO was. Although one should 
not forget that after all we are still talking about the level exceeding 50%. Respondents 
continued to believe that the balance was definitely favourable; what changed was, as 
I have already mentioned, only the scale of support. 
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Illustration 8  CBOS-BS 28   February 1999 
 
The feeling of safety can be checked as at ”today” and ”tomorrow” – the latter 
option was selected by the authors who in the OBOP questionnaire (Illustration 8) 
suggested to look at the issue of safety in the perspective of the next ten years; the 
questions referred to the increase of the feeling of safety on the one hand, and its loss 
on the other. One may only regret that research on that issue was initiated only as late 
as in 1997 when the tension in the Balkan Peninsula probably changed in a sense the 
nature of opinions. 
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   Taking account of the results achieved NATO is undoubtedly perceived as a 
formation that can effectively protect its members. This seems obvious, whereas the 
percentage of people who believe that there is some external menace to us 
undoubtedly arouses reflection. It is symptomatic that in the years 1997-1999 this 
number remained unchanged. Even the latest research that was conducted in February 
when our membership in NATO was already decided has not brought any changes. 
The interpretation of this fact may be of a twofold nature: either Poland - in the 
consciousness of its citizens - was under NATO’s protective ”umbrella” the moment 
it entered the ”Partnership for Peace” programme, or another way to explain this 
sequence of data is to assume that the accession to NATO ”went unnoticed”, as for 
that fragment of reality, by the compatriots. The fact of obtaining the safety guarantee  
 
        Taking account of the international situation and power arrangement in the     
world    can Poland, within the next, say ten years have a feeling of safety,  
                          or should it rather be afraid of any country or countries? (%) 
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    3 
 
 
  26   
   2 
 
 
  24 
  5.  Difficult to say      11      11      7    11 
    Table. 6.  OBOP March 1999 
 
        through the inclusion in the NATO’s framework did not in itself convince the 
unconvinced that the aim of this organisation was to increase the safety of its 
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members. Poland was admitted to NATO only in March, whereas the question was 
not so much about the ”here and now”, but about the prospect of ten years. 
This time we undoubtedly come across an important historical threshold. This 
situation offers an opportunity of quite a precise (for opinion polling) analysis of the 
complicated character of opinions, attitudes, and factors that influence their changes. 
In connection with events taking place in the Balkans certain frustrations arise among 
some of the public opinion that, as one may presume, result from the discord between 
the conviction as to what is right and the thing that should be done. Those views 
became best visible in connection with an answer to the following question(Table 7). 
As it can be noticed a considerable part of public opinion fully accepts the fact of 
Poland joining NATO, while at the same time noticing the place that Poland occupies 
in ”that line”. One can see that the entire flow of opinions comprised those who had 
univocal views on our position in connection with joining NATO. The undecided 
placed within the ”difficult to say” group did not practically undergo any quantitative 
 
                       Which of the following statements is closest to your views 
                                       on Poland joining NATO?(%) 
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 1. 
NATO membership will rather be a guarantee 
of Poland’s independence 
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49 
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 2. 
NATO membership will rather be a new form 
of Poland’s submission to another foreign   
world-power 
 
30 
 
36 
 
 42 
 
 3. 
 
Difficult to say 
 
14 
 
15 
  
16 
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  changes. This situation makes us aware that contrary to frequent complaints about 
political choices that are made by the Polish electorate (which after all constitutes 
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public opinion, even if not the active, then at least the potential one), these are in some 
cases based on rationality. One would like to ask a question of that over 10-30 % group 
that votes for NATO being convinced that in a sense it takes away from them (us) the 
sovereignty, what the alternative rational solution was. Let us repeat that in February 
1999 the degree of approval for our NATO–related aspirations amounted to 67% in 
OBOP research, and 51% in CBOS polls.  
    
C.  Poles on ”Partnership for Peace” programme. 
    The concept of ”Partnership for Peace” was supposed to bring the countries that 
emerged after the break-up of the ”Eastern bloc” closer to NATO procedures and 
standards. One had also started to see that the countries that joined this programme 
became, to some extent, an element of construction of a new political and military 
order in Europe. Those political assumptions were similarly interpreted by public 
opinion. In 1994 CBOS (July) asked citizens twice: “Will the admission of Poland and 
other postsocialist countries to NATO become an element of stabilisation and 
peace?”, or whether the contrary will happen. In January and June almost 70% of 
respondents believed that the admission of those countries to NATO would increase 
the chances for stabilisation and peace. It is important that the stabilising role that 
participation in the aforementioned programme had resulted in for the Central Europe 
was noticed and confirmed by Polish public opinion. This general point of view found 
its reflection in research conducted in March 1994 by another polling institute (OBOP, 
March). To the question: “Does Partnership for Peace increase Poland’s safety?” 66 
% of respondents gave an affirmative answer. Thus, the inclusion of the Central and 
Eastern European countries to the ”Programme” resulted in the increase of the feeling 
of safety – at least among the Poles. 
            Simultaneously, with the signature of the ”Partnership for Peace” accession 
document by Mr. Waldemar Pawlak (the then Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Poland) the support and belief of public opinion in the possibility of a quicker 
accession to NATO increased. In January 1994 (CBOS) 33% of respondents were of 
the opinion that the participation in the ”Programme” gave us a chance for NATO 
membership. As a consequence of the opening of numerous communication channels 
the level of knowledge about the ”Programme” itself began to increase among the 
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public opinion. What real chances for NATO membership does the participation in 
”Partnership for Peace” give? This resulted in a situation where, as I have already 
mentioned, at the beginning of June that year 46% of respondents said that it was a 
chance for joining NATO.  
    Participation in the ”Partnership for Peace” programme was largely connected with 
the co-operation at various levels of commanding staff, participation in joint military 
exercises, etc. Those tasks were meant to bring about a situation where the accession 
of Poland and other countries would take place in the circumstances of full 
compatibility of individual elements that were crucial for the efficient functioning. 
One could say that a certain proportion of the Polish public opinion (which we have 
already mentioned) treated accession to NATO in a rather hypothetical way, as if the 
issue under consideration was not a military structure with all the consequences 
thereof. One of the issues that triggered a strong reaction of the public was 
Polishsoldiers’ participation in various military actions.  
What is your opinion on the use of Polish soldiers abroad? 
Are you in favour of Polish soldier’s being sent abroad to the areas of          
Table 8.   CBOS – BS 151/151.  November 1998 
Indications of respondents by dates 
of opinion polls 
 
  No. 
 
                    Answers 
  June 1998  October 1998 
1  I strongly support it  9 10 
2  I rather support it  33 
 
42  26 
 
36 
3  I don’t care  8 10 
4  I rather don’t support it  25 24 
5  I definitely don’t support it  18 
 
43  23 
 
47 
6  Difficult to say  7 7 
 
        In  October  1998  this  general  question began to have a very specific 
dimension. Situation in Yugoslavia contributed to the fact that those hypothetical 
considerations referred, in a presumed way, to reality. This phenomenon can be 
noticed on the basis of comparative research conducted by CBOS. In October 1998 
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37% of respondents were in favour of the participation of Polish soldiers in the 
mission in Kosovo, whereas in the poll conducted on 26-29 March 1999 this support 
dropped to 32%. On the other hand, the number of people opposing the idea amounted 
to 54% in March 1999. This ”negative group” increased by 12% from October 1998 to 
March 1999 (CBOS - BS/53. April 1999). The same questions asked two weeks later 
by CBOS canvassers (BS/64 8-13 April) gave similar results (± 2%). The more so 
because in the autumn 1998 it was not known yet what the nature of that participation 
of Polish soldiers would be: whether in a peacekeeping mission to preserve the ”fruit 
of (possible) victory”, or  in combat.  
          That  problem  became  more  specific  in  1999  (as  it  follows  from  OBOP 
research). At that time, in March (30-31) and April (17-19), OBOP asked the 
respondents about their attitude towards those problems. From among four identical 
questions that were asked, in two cases the approval diminished. In the first case it 
decreased from 18% to 16% for the most radical idea mentioning the participation of 
Polish soldiers in combat. In the second one the support for the standpoint: “no, 
Poland should not send soldiers at all” dropped from 28% to 24%. At the same time 
the support for the idea of Polish army participation in armed forces if it did not have 
to take part in combat increased from 13% to 17%. The second option that saw the 
increase of support was the participation of soldiers in peacekeeping activities after the 
end of a conflict. Among the parameters that considerably influenced answers one 
should enumerate education, interest in politics, attitude to religion and financial 
situation. Let us analyse that dependence by taking into consideration one of the four 
questions – the most radical one saying that Poland should send its soldiers even if 
they had to fight. Affirmative answer to that question was given by 10% of people 
with elementary education and 32% with university degree. People declaring that 
”they take no interest at all” in politics - 11%, those who ”rather take no interest” - 
14%, whereas those who ”are very interested” - 23%. People who said that they were 
”believing Christians and practising Catholics” accepted such an action in 13%, those 
who ”believe but do not practise” - in 25%, whereas „the unreligious ones” – in 43%. 
In the case of this criterion and the question (statement) saying that soldiers should 
participate in missions, but only the peacekeeping ones consisting in some order-
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related activities, believing Christians accepted that form primarily in 46%, whereas 
the unreligious people only in 25%. 
 
   D. Youth on NATO 
    Such results prompt us to give special attention to the group that from the point 
of view of the future consolidation of relationships within the alliance is probably of 
the most crucial importance, namely the youth. During our participation in the 
”Partnership for Peace” programme on 13-22 April CBOS conducted opinion polls 
that covered the group of 1275 students of the final grades of postprimary schools. The 
feature that immediately draws attention is the distribution of opinions regarding the 
interest in problems relating to the aspirations of Poland to join NATO.  
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It turns out that a special group, due to its size, constitute those who declare a more or 
less marked political indifference. As many as 35% of answers constitute those that 
refer to the statements ”I take no interest at all” and ”I rather take no interest in it”. 
This group constitutes an element that most visibly distinguishes the population of 
young people from the remainder of the society. Among the young the number of 
individuals giving that answer is decidedly higher. It is difficult to univocally interpret 
this fact. One point of view could consist in the statement that young people are 
generally inclined to ignore the problems of ”the adults” frequently wishing to 
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ostentatiously cut themselves off the world they take no interest in, mainly for 
psychological, axiological and cultural reasons. The second way of interpretation 
could accuse the young with ignorance resulting from the lack of knowledge. The 
third point of view, in turn, could be of a more optimistic nature, namely that young 
people are not interested in problems connected with NATO, our (Polish) aspirations 
and the significance of that issue, not for the reasons of their aversion to politics, but 
because Poland is sovereign, because they are able to travel around the world without 
any restrictions, because if there are wars somewhere, they take place far away from 
our borders, and because generally they think that these are not their problems.  
        At the same time Poland, due to its religious and ethnic structure that shows 
the highest uniformity in Europe, is void of many potential trouble spots. Since they 
do not feel threatened in any way, some of the young show no interest in that  
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       Illustration 10.    CBOS – BS 109/197.  July 1996            
      subject.  It  seems  highly  probable  because it generally finds its confirmation in 
connection with research regarding other problems. People (I have the so-called average 
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citizens in mind) that for instance do not normally have any contact with for example 
pathological phenomena such as domestic violence, alcoholism, the drug habit, theft or 
corruption usually can properly assess the extent of those phenomena only when they happen 
to have at least the slightest experience of those matters. The reflection of the tendencies 
discussed is the following opinion(Ilustration 10). 
As it can be seen in the diagram above, it is the increase of that ”difficult to 
say” group rather than decrease in the number of people who were in favour of joining 
NATO. Which, as it can be noticed, does not change the fact that the pro-NATO option 
is pretty strong also among the young. Taking into account the parameters that largely 
determined the views of young people we can see that these included gender, type of 
school (e.g. basic vocational school or high school), interest in politics and the kind of 
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  L                   Personal details         Yes        No 
  P  Total  64 36 
   1. 
Gender: 
Men 
Women 
 
72 
53 
 
28 
47 
   2. 
Type of school: 
Secondary school of general 
education 
Secondary technical school 
Secondary school of vocational 
education 
Basic vocational school 
 
74 
 
69 
61 
 
59 
 
26 
 
31 
39 
 
41 
   3. 
Interest in politics: 
Strong 
Average 
Weak or none 
 
94 
73 
35 
 
6 
27 
65 
  4. 
What kind of student do you 
consider yourself? 
With bad marks (D and C) 
With good marks (B) 
With excellent marks (A) 
 
 
60 
67 
73 
 
 
40 
33 
27 
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student that a given person considers himself or herself to be (with good or bad marks). 
These options are presented in the Table below that contains answers to the following 
question (Table 9. 
 
E. Army takes the floor. 
          Research regarding the problem of safety, and in particular the intention of 
Poland to join NATO, covered two social sub-groups. We have already presented the 
views of one of them, whereas the second one constituted officers. Undoubtedly the 
attitude of that group, its opinions are of special importance. After all we treat 
differently an answer to the question about, for instance, the degree of modernity of 
the army given by civilians that have nothing to do with the army, than we treat the 
answer given by officers and soldiers themselves. Of particular importance are 
especially the evaluations relating to the merits of those areas that, by the force of 
events, are best known to that portion of the society. One became to take special 
interest in the opinions of that group only when the programme ”Partnership for 
Peace” was launched. Since 1994 the military circles have begun to be quite regularly 
monitored. It has to be acknowledged that NATO ”Programme” was at that time 
approached with a certain dose of scepticism. Talking about ”Partnership for Peace” 
one even made a kind of a paraphrase saying ”Partnership for being left in peace”. 
Some circles, especially among the cadre, continued to treat NATO itself with certain 
scepticism, whereas there was a group of officers who believed that this programme 
was in a sense ”a bone” thrown to the group of countries demanding to be admitted to 
NATO in order to give them ”something” that would constitute a certain substitute for 
the real membership.  
                Scepticism resulting from the way the military circles looked at the 
”Partnership for Peace” programme practically continued throughout the entire period 
of its functioning. The results of opinion polls presented below indicate that the 
Programme was perceived as an undertaking that was supposed to bring profit mainly 
to NATO countries instead of those that it was aimed at.  
In comparison to the initial research the opinion as to the benefits derived by 
various political formations has considerably changed. Still, in 1997 when the prospect 
of joining NATO seemed to be quite real, especially for ”Visegrad Group” countries, 
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the percentage of people among the cadre that would notice any benefits for the pre-
accession countries decreased most radically. And yet, in July 1997 the membership of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in NATO was already decided. However, a 
considerable part of the cadre still believed that maybe not so much the United State      
as the Western Europe was the main beneficiary of that process. It was exactly the 
position of the U.S. that underwent a change, and a most visible one, too. An 
interesting ”sociological object” is also a group of officers (although it has to be 
admitted that it was not a big one) that subscribe to the thesis that ”Partnership for 
Peace” benefits ”nobody”. A question that was asked of the officers related to the 
following: Is that Programme the best solution in the field of ensuring the European 
safety? If we treat the answers “rather yes” and “yes” jointly as the 
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affirmative ones and those “rather not” and “not” as the negative ones then in 
February 1994 50% of respondents answered in the affirmative while 37 % answered 
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in the negative. In November 1997 77% of respondents gave affirmative answers 
whereas 14% gave negative replies. As it can be seen it is a significant change of 
attitudes towards that concept among officers. The increase of support took place not 
only because of the intellectual factor, i.e. better knowledge of the programme or a 
more impartial evaluation. Taking into account the opinions that were formulated 
about the Army, its financial, technical, technological, organisational and ethical 
condition one may suppose that some of the officers treated the participation of 
Poland, and particularly that of its army, in the Partnership for Peace in an 
instrumental way. It was expected that our co-operation within the framework of the 
Programme and aiming at NATO membership would cause the flow of money. That 
money was supposed to enable the activation of processes adapting our army to 
NATO standards. It was also expected that the situation would force the authorities to 
financially reinforce the army and would eliminate those phenomena that were 
regarded as negative ones and such that could prevent the integration. Such an attitude 
was justified in the autumn 1997, as the United States allocated financial resources to 
the countries aiming at membership, i.e. to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
whereas the introduction of NATO Normalisation Standards (STANG-s) made 
everyone aware that there was no way of ‘wangling’ or ‘letting it be’.  
         As we have mentioned before research was conducted that related not only 
to the issues connected with NATO, but concerned also the evaluation of the Polish 
army. The research covered not only officers, but also soldiers in basic military 
service. They were asked, among others, the same question that CBOS asked in its 
polls: “If referendum was held on the accession to NATO, would you vote” - 64% 
were for, 10% would be against and 26% of soldiers found it difficult to take a 
stand (Polska Zbrojna No. 15, April 1998: 4). These data are in a sense similar to 
the ones that were collected in the nation-wide research. The differences arise 
mainly from the specificity of the group that basic military service soldiers 
constitute. Its nature is marked by such data as age: usually around 18-24 and 
education: mainly elementary and basic vocational one. This results in a particularly 
high percentage of ”difficult to say” replies (in nation-wide research this number of 
answers among people with elementary education amounted to 18%, whereas that 
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among people with secondary and university education reached 5% and 2% 
respectively - CBOS July 1997).  
What is your general opinion about the situation of the Polish army? 
58
30
10
1 1
1. Negative
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
123456
2. Highly negative
3. Neither positive, nor 
negative
4. Positive
5. Highly positive
6. Difficult to say
0
  
Illustration 12.    Polska Zbrojna No. 40  October 1998: 
 
Similar  4 relations can be noticed while looking at the replies accepting Polish pro-
NATO aspirations. In nation-wide research the group with elementary education 
that said  ”yes” amounted to 69% (to remind you: among soldiers it was 64%), 
while among people with secondary and university education the results were 82%  
and 91% respectively.  Soldiers in basic military service showed high criticism with 
respect to the ”condition” of the Polish Army. The first of the questions relating to 
those issues was as follows(Ilustration 12). 
If we summed up the replies testifying to positive and negative opinions, we 
would achieve a rather pessimistic picture. Such a breakdown would indicate that 88% 
of soldiers are of a negative opinion about the condition of the Polish army while 
positive opinions are formulated only by 2%, which is practically below the 3% 
margin that is assumed to constitute the statistical error. Similar criticism of soldiers 
referred also to the armament of the unit in which they serve. In that case summing up 
the two negative answers we achieve 71% of soldiers who believe that their unit is 
“very poorly or poorly” armed with war weapons (Polska Zbrojna No. 46 November 
1998: 4). Whereas to the question ”Do you think that Polish military potential is at the 
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moment sufficient with respect to the degree of threats to our safety?” as many as 88% 
of respondents said, as in the case of the former question, that is was “not sufficient”.  
    Coming back to the issues directly relating to NATO, 54% of soldiers found it quite 
easy to give an affirmative reply to the question: ”Would you accept the subordination 
of Polish troops to NATO command?” 37%, however, would rather be against it 
(Polska Zbrojna No.18 May 1998). Another symptomatic phenomenon (apart from the 
criticism) that can be observed while analysing the replies given by soldiers is the 
minimum amount of ”difficult to say” opinions. This in turn would testify in a sense to 
the competence of soldiers with respect to the questions asked of them, but first of all 
to their emotional involvement.  
 
F. Integration with NATO as an element of political stabilisation in Europe. 
        Integration processes connected with ideas of Euro-Atlantic integration brought 
results that were both objective and subjective. Apart from increasing the feeling of 
safety in the opinion of the public, the other area where one can notice effects of that 
integration are processes increasing that safety in an objective way. If the latter factor 
is of less interest to us (it might be much more so to strategists, staff officers or 
authors of military doctrine), the subjective factor, i.e. the consciousness in the case of 
public opinion description is much more interesting. Therefore we will not concern 
ourselves with objective factors of integration. 
      Let  us  take  a  look,  firstly,  at  the degree to which Poland’s feeling of safety 
increases, mainly according to Polish public opinion, and secondly, to what extent 
integration processes influence the increase of the feeling of safety in Europe and the 
Central European region, again mainly according to Polish public opinion. Both issues 
found their reflection in research conducted by polling institutions. CBOS, quoted 
above, researched that issue in the years 1994 – 1999. 
       Studying the indications of respondents one is undoubtedly surprised by the result 
achieved in 1999. Despite the fact that still more than a half of respondents perceive 
our membership in NATO as a stabilising factor, the drop by 8% in that ”optimism 
factor” has to arouse reflection. Explanation seem relatively simple – the situation 
connected with the preparation of the action against Serbia (we will give more 
attention to that event later). The polarisation of public opinion connected with 
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Serbian actions in Kosovo also offers some explanation as to the changes that took 
place in the respondents’ minds. We have already mentioned that changes may take 
place in public opinion as a result of events that make some of the public change what 
seemed to be their fixed views. Such an event was undoubtedly the situation that 
occurred in the former Yugoslavia. Change of views connected with that situation 
found its confirmation also in the way of perceiving advantages that Poland would 
gain through the integration with NATO.  
In the situation where NATO was a military organisation that practically never 
engaged its army in offensive actions, in public consciousness it was a defensive 
mechanism that was known to be powerful but never let us find out how it looked like 
in practice. One should specifically emphasise the controversy of that fact for public  
intervention of NATO army in Serbia aroused numerous controversies of political, 
military, legal and international, as well as civilisation, ethical and religious nature. 
 
           Which of the following statements does more closely correspond with 
                          Your  opinion on Poland’s accession to NATO? (%) 
 
Indications by dates of opinion 
polls 
 
No. 
      
            Answer 
 I’94   I’96  I’97   I’98   II’99 
 
1. 
Accession of Poland to NATO shall rather 
contribute to the enhancement of peace and 
stabilisation in Europe 
 
  59 
 
  66 
 
  68 
 
  65 
 
  57 
 
2. 
Accession of Poland to NATO shall rather 
contribute to the enhancement of tensions and 
uncertainty in Europe 
 
  16 
 
  14 
 
  17 
 
  16 
 
  21 
3.  Difficult to say    25    20    15    19    22 
Table 10.  CBOS – BS 28  February 1999 
      These issues made people change their evaluations of the profit and loss balance. 
As you can see in the diagram below opinions that were formulated while discussing 
Table 8 find something more than just confirmation. Questions that were asked of 
50  
respondents and replies to them leave no doubt as to the major reason of the change of 
views on integration with NATO. Although one should not forget that we still operate 
at the level of over 50%. The respondents were also of the opinion that the balance 
was definitely favourable; what changed was, as I have already mentioned, only the 
scale of support. 
Concurrence of two significant events, i.e. accession of Poland to NATO and 
initiation of NATO’s armed intervention in the Balkans resulted in numerous changes 
and, what follows, interesting observations. Such extreme situations monitored by 
polling centres make it possible to track the evolution of large social groups’ opinions 
caused by political facts. In connection with events in the Balkans there appear 
certain frustrations among a portion of the public opinion that may be attributed to the 
discord between what is right and what should be done. These views became best 
visible in connection with the answer to the question: (Illustration 13). 
Which of the following statements does more closely correspond with  ;your 
opinion on Poland’s accession to NATO? Accession to NATO 
 
I. 1998 
 
 
 
 
II. 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
55% 
 
27% 
 
17% 
                            
                                     68% 
 
16% 
 
       16% 
  
 
 
      - will rather secure peace and safety for Poland 
 
      - will rather increase the possibility of Poland becoming involved in an armed    
        conflict 
    - difficult to say 
 
 
Illustration 13    CBOS – BS/ 28   February 1999 
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           As it can be seen the vast proportion of public opinion fully accepts Poland’s 
accession to NATO being aware, however, what the place of Poland in ”that line” is. 
One can notice that the entire flow of opinions comprised those who had univocal 
views on our position in connection with joining NATO. The undecided placed within 
the ”difficult to say” group did not practically undergo any quantitative changes. This 
situation makes us become aware that contrary to frequent complaints about political 
choices that are made by the Polish electorate (which after all constitutes public 
opinion, even if not the active, then at least the potential one), these choices are in some 
cases based on rationality. One would like to ask a question of that over 10-30 % group 
(according to the same research by CBOS 51% of respondents are in favour of 
accession to NATO, whereas according to OBOP research conducted in February 1999 
as well, the affirmative answer was given by 67%) that votes for NATO while being 
convinced that in a sense it takes away from them (us) the sovereignty, what the 
alternative rational solution was.  
 
Which of the following statements does most closely correspond with your views 
on Poland joining NATO?(%) 
 
Indications by dates of opinion polls   
No 
 
                      Answer     I ’98     VI ’98     II ‘99 
 
 1. 
NATO membership will rather be a 
 guarantee of Poland’s independence 
 
56 
 
49 
 
41 
 
 2. 
NATO membership will rather be a  
new form of Poland’s submission 
 to another foreign  world-power 
 
30 
 
36 
 
42 
 
 3. 
 
Difficult to say 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
Table 11.   CBOS – BS/28 February 1999 
 
 
 
                     
52 G.  Poland – Russia and other post-Soviet countries. 
 
      Poland’s presence in NATO has always been determined - whether in an 
articulated, or alleged way - in the context of its ‘presence’ near Germany and Russia. 
If there was any threat it was primarily that posed by Russia to Poland and not the 
other way round. The dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation resulted in the 
lack of the feeling of safety among all the former signatories thereto. When Central 
European countries began looking for a guarantor of their safety, Russia tried to 
preserve ”the remains of its former position”. This manifested itself mainly in 
vigorous protests relating to the aspirations of former Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
countries. As I have mentioned before, in their calculations Poland as well as NATO - 
while negotiating - had to take into consideration the presence of Russia, its opinions 
and interests. It concerned - to a greater extent - politicians than, as it can be inferred 
from the results of research, the public opinion. The change after 1989 took place 
rapidly and radically, which raises a number of questions as to the credibility of 
previous declarations made by the public.   
Respondents considering the USSR:
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 Illustration 14.  CBOS – BS/193/37.   April 1990  
 
 
  Polish public opinion generally noticed this special role played by Russia and drew 
conclusions that were determined, among others, by historical events. In the 
declarations of the vast proportion of public opinion the role played by the USSR 
changed diametrically within the period of three years. Simultaneously, in 1990 
 
53 another important phenomenon occurred, namely those who regarded Russia as an 
enemy began to be in the majority. With the progress of time this tendency grew even 
stronger. In 1997 the following question was asked Looking at the above table one 
may even venture to say that in the consciousness of Poles Russia actually became the 
primary and the only threat. The scale of that threat found its confirmation among the 
cadre of the Polish Army. In the opinion poll conducted in 1994 75% of officers saw 
the primary threat to Poland in Russia and that quantity displayed a growing tendency 
because in the polls conducted in 1993 such an opinion had been expressed by 56% 
of respondents (A. Sakson 1998: 77). It can be seen that, in practice, Poles worry 
mainly about the peace at the eastern border. Not earlier than several years ago 
opinions voiced were totally different. In 1993 (CBOS BS/181/146.  November), 
while answering a similar question where more countries could be indicated, the 
respondents were of a firm opinion that the biggest threat was posed by Germany - 
56% (Russia received 30% of indications). 
 
What are the current ”external threats” to the independence of our country? 
 
1.  Russia...............................................................................................….....40% 
2.  General statement ”Eastern neighbours”, ”ex-Soviet countries” etc. …11% 
3.  Germany...............................................................................................….6% 
4.  Ukraine................................................................................................…...4% 
5.  ”neighbours”, ”bordering countries” – no definite indications…………..3% 
6.  general indications, such as: ”geopolitical location of Poland”, 
            ”unrest in the world”, ”there is threat from everywhere” etc.............…....3% 
7.  Poland’s accession to NATO.............................................................….....2% 
 
Table 12.    CBOS – BS 107/107.   September 1997 
 
   The interesting thing is that at that time the bigger threat was also seen as 
being presented by Ukraine - 42%. As I have already mentioned within several years 
these views underwent a serious ”restructuring”. The remaining of our neighbouring 
countries were in principle not perceived as posing real threat to Poland. As it can be 
 
54 noticed in the above table the major threat according to the vast proportion of public 
opinion was posed by Russia, whereas post-Soviet countries were ranked second at 
that time. Similar problem became an object of interest to the Public Research Centre 
in Sopot. In 1995 respondents asked by that institution indicated five countries that in 
their opinion could present threat to Poland. Two-thirds of respondents indicated 
Russia, whereas 38% were afraid of Germany and 35% saw the source of danger in 
Ukraine. Belorus as a threat was perceived by 7% of respondents, whereas Lithuania 
by 6% (A. Sakson 1998: 77).  
In the years 1992-1995 CBOS researched the public opinion perception of the 
break-up of the USSR (Illustration 15). As it can be seen this fact underwent an 
evident evolution within public opinion. Between 1992 and 1995 changes took place 
that turned the proportions upside down. In 1995 the number of people who believed 
that it was a positive phenomenon increased from 21% to 42%, whereas the number 
of people who were of a contrary opinion dropped from 47% to 23%. At the same 
time the most significant change took place in the case of radical answers; statements 
such as ”difficult to say” and ”it remained unchanged” showed considerable stability.    
 
Do you believe that as a result of the break-up of the USSR into 
numerous independent countries the situation of Poland, generally speaking? 
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 Illustration 15.      CBOS – BS/39/32/95.   February 1995 
    
 
55 As it can be inferred from Table 12 (September 1997), creation of new 
countries east of Poland was ranked second in terms of threat by the respondents. 
Initial pessimistic moods, as already mentioned, underwent a significant modification, 
which does not change the fact that some of the neighbours evoke, greater or smaller, 
but still fear. Undoubtedly the major anxiety is caused by Belorus and its 
unconventional leader. The accession of Belorus to the Commonwealth of 
Independent Countries was, in particular, deemed an unfavourable event by 43% of 
respondents in 1995. Some of the respondents, i.e. 24% regarded that fact as an 
insignificant one.  
         The major influence on the views expressed in the opinion polls regarding the 
aforementioned threats was exerted by education. In the case of questions about the 
threat posed by the Commonwealth of Independent Countries also 36% of people 
with elementary education deemed that fact unfavourable for Poland, whereas among 
people with university education as many as 48% evaluated (that objectively 
unfavourable fact for Poland) as negative, in accordance with political realities, thus 
being undoubtedly nearer the truth.  
           Similar  scepticism  was  shown  by  the  respondents  towards  Ukraine  and 
Ukrainians. In CBOS research from August 1998 (BS 104/104), when asked about the 
prospects of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in June 1998, 48% of respondents said that 
”it is rather and absolutely possible”, whereas 37 % of respondents believed that 
unfortunately ”it is rather and absolutely impossible”. Compared to 1997 the number 
of those who optimistically looked at the possibility of reconciliation with our Eastern 
neighbour dropped by as many as 12%, whereas the number of opponents remained 
practically at the stable level of 39%. Although that research did not refer to the 
question of safety or military problems in Polish-Ukrainian relationships, but the replies 
indicate potential barriers and attitudes in the relations between the communities of 
Poland and Ukraine. It does not change the fact that Polish politicians started to treat 
the relationship with Ukraine in an ostentatiously warm manner (especially A. 
Kwaśniewski), emphasising the importance of good relationship between our countries, 
saying at every occasion that we were a ”bridge to Europe” for Ukraine and perceived 
ourselves in such a role. Similar statement was made, among others, by B. Geremek: 
”From our point of view it is important that relationship between NATO and Ukraine 
 
56 should be determined in a process parallel to the negotiations between NATO and 
Russia. This is compliant with Polish foreign policy, which we have expressed for many 
years”. (Życie 19. 05. 1997).  
         Looking at the answers evaluating Polish – German and Polish – Russian 
relationships one can see that emotional attitudes find their reflection also in the 
opinions on safety. All types of phobias and stereotypes that have been accumulating 
for years between the nations are currently reflected, as it can be seen, in the 
consciousness and attitudes of public opinion. It is a result of certain mechanisms that 
are of an objective nature and result from the confrontation of large social groups that 
differ from one another and, consequently, often have divergent interests.  
 
              ”Never in your life will a German become a Pole’s friend” 
                                           is true or not? (%). 
  
No.           Education  I agree  I disagree  Difficult to say 
  1.            elementary            69              24                 7 
  2.  basic vocational            65              31                 4 
  3.              secondary            61              35                 4 
  4.              university            41              57                 2 
     Table 13.  CBOS – BS 137/113.    September 1993 
Authors of an opinion poll questionnaire used, as a motto of one of the questions, a 
saying that was supposed to illustrate the depth of Polish – German animosities. 
Respondents were to estimate to what extent the saying(Table 13.). 
        This comparison, as I have mentioned, is highly significant. Firstly, it cannot 
be denied that the saying quoted in the question is an exemplification of the stereotype 
concerning Germans and the “centuries-old“ hostility between Poles and Germans. The 
results, however, indicate in a conclusive way what the importance of knowledge 
gained in the course of education is for the overcoming of those phobias. This also 
confirms a scientific thesis regarding the measures that should be applied in order to 
overcome stereotypes. Secondly, what draws attention is the difference between the 
results achieved in responses of people with university education and those with the 
 
57 elementary or secondary one. The difference between the answers given by respondents 
with elementary and secondary education is almost twice as  small as that between 
people with secondary and university education. It would be hard to achieve some more 
conclusive evidence as to the necessity of raising and extending the level of education. 
Education proves to be the most efficient factor that overcomes prejudice, stereotypes 
and myths. It has to be acknowledged that Poles showed a lot of scepticism (realism?) 
in their pro-NATO declarations. It found its reflection in the opinions on the 
relationship between NATO and Russia, especially in the context of our joining NATO. 
This thesis is demonstrated by Illustration 16. 
  
 
                Do you consider it possible that NATO countries agree with Russia 
                                 about Poland behind its back? (%) 
 
28
20
52
24
19
57
24
26
50
24
54
24
26
50
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0
XI 1993
I 1994
VI 1994
V. 1995
V. 1996
Serie1 Serie2 Serie3
22
Difficult to say Yes No
 
    Illustration 16  CBOS – BS 120/106.  July 1994;  CBOS - BS 103/101. July 1996. 
 
        As you can see Poles do not trust the so-called Western politicians. Political 
experience of the past 200 years at least partially explains that scepticism. It has to be 
acknowledged that the lapse of time rather contributed to the increase of such distrust. 
 
58 That scepticism towards NATO and Russia underwent certain modifications in the 
course of time, but was nevertheless maintained; one may say that the value of 
distrust did not drop below 50%. Those theses find their confirmation in the activities 
and declarations of Western politicians as well. Many of them, both in the Eastern 
and Western Europe and in 2001 as well, continue to form sceptical opinions as to the 
behaviour of their Western colleagues, because these politicians frequently use 
arguments that are similar to those used several years ago. This time they do and say 
that with respect to other candidates on the occasion of subsequent attempts at NATO 
enlargement. Such activities concern especially the post-Soviet countries. Generally it 
is difficult to hear such univocal declarations that would indicate the existence of 
Russian syndrome or complex. However, when we take a look at public opinion polls 
in Poland we will see that such fears, or Russian complex, do have a bearing on 
politics and politicians and are perceived as such by public opinion. No denials can 
help here because this policy is perceived in exactly such a way.  
          The words of Vaclav Havel at the conference held in Bratislava on 11. 05. 
2001 devoted to, among other things, the issues connected with NATO enlargement 
(which decision is to be taken at the summit in Prague in 2002) can serve as an 
exemplification of that thesis: ”Contrary to numerous politicians who behave 
towards Russia in an obsequious and insincere way, in a misconceived interest of 
preserving peace and friendship with that country, I believe that – for the sake of real 
friendship with Russia – one should negotiate with it as with an equal partner and tell 
the whole truth, even if not too pleasant one. (Gazeta Wyborcza 2001). As it can be 
seen Vaclaw Havel, in his views, comes closer to the predominant voices within 
public opinion than some of the Western politicians do. In 1994 those views were 
shared by a vast proportion of Polish public opinion that took a firm stand while 
evaluating the attitude of certain countries in 1994(Ilustration17). 
   Poles turned out to be particularly sensitive (as it could be expected) about 
their sovereignty. As we know Russia raised objections as to the accession of Poland 
to NATO as soon as Polish politicians began to officially express such a will. Vast 
majority of respondents believe that Russia should not voice its opinions as to 
alliances formed by Poland at all. Such views were formulated by 83% of respondents 
(only 5% chose an answer ”yes, Russia may express its opinion on that matter”). 
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                               Do the United States care mainly about: 
      
14%
18%
68%
Good relationship 
with Russia.
Difficult to say
Ensuring safety for Poland and other 
countries of the former "Soviet bloc".  
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 17. CBOS – BS/17/14.  February 1994 
 
The majority also think that Poland should not take Russia’s standpoint into 
consideration. As for the opinions on that subject, the more decided ones are those 
formulated by young people under 24 years of age (82%), than those expressed by 
older people, over 65 years of age, who would only in 53% be inclined to say that 
Poland should ignore the stand that Russia takes on our NATO aspirations. Similar 
relationships occur if we take into consideration the criterion of education. The 
number of people in favour of this view increases with the level of education – from 
60% in the group with elementary education up to 81% among people with university 
education (CBOS – BS/181/146  November 1993). 
     Special role of Russia resulting from the past and connected also with the 
nature of relationship between those having power in Kremlin and the Central 
European countries arouses constant fear of public opinion not only in Poland, but 
also in the remaining postsocialist states. Some of the Russian politicians find it very 
difficult to accept the situation where Russia ceased to be a world power. All the 
more so as this country in incapable of coping with its own internal problems in 
practically any area. An argument testifying to the fact that the standpoint of Russian 
politicians had to be irritating is the discord between the views of political class and 
those of the Russian public opinion. As for the attitude of the Russian public toward 
the danger connected  with Poland joining NATO, 64% has no view on that subject. 
 
60 Only 18% see the danger whereas the same percentage notices none (A. Sakson 1998: 
78). Such views of the public opinion contradict, as I have said, the official attitude of 
authorities. This in turn presents a threat by indicating the autonomy of the political 
class with respect to their own nation. It has to be admitted that such a conclusion 
comes to mind while observing the Russian political scene: a normal manipulatory 
procedure can be at work here consisting in the frightening of one’s own nation with 
”the approach of NATO towards Russian borders”. From the military point of view 
this issue is of marginal importance now. The discord between the authorities and 
citizens comes with no particular surprise in that case. Remarks that could be made 
with respect to the public itself would concern three issues. Firstly, the accession of 
Poland to NATO is of no significance to the Russian society, especially bearing in 
mind the contemporary technology. Secondly, it may result from the lack of 
information on that subject. Thirdly, the opinions expressed may arise from the 
subconscious temperance while giving univocal answers to controversial questions.  
 
Will Russia - in the nearest future - aim at rebuilding 
its sphere of influence in our part of Europe?(%) 
 
        Table 14.  CBOS – BS/28 February 1999 
                        Indications by dates of opinion polls   
No. 
 
      Answers     
VI’93    
 
VI’ 94 
 
V’95 
 
V ‘96 
 
VI’97 
 
VI’98 
 
II’99 
 
 
II ‘00 
 
1. 
Yes  39  53  72 69 63 59 53 60 
 
2. 
No  39  26  14 13 19 20 23 
 
22 
 
3. 
Difficult to say  22  21  14 18 17 21 24  18 
 
           Military, political, ethnic, religious, financial, etc. problems all cause that the 
world is constantly looking at Russia with fear. In the 1990s there was a permanent 
fear within the Polish society connected with Russian tendencies to regain the 
position that the Soviet Union used to have in the Central Europe. In 1995 
respondents asked by CBOS (BS/149/125 July 1995) in 62% believed that the 
 
61 situation in Russia evolved towards dictatorship rather than democracy (13%). This 
indicates the conviction that there were strong autocratic tendencies in this country.  
       One may notice an interesting phenomenon that is the relationship between 
the opinion on a given subject and the level of interest in the social and political life. 
Respondents were asked a question regarding the degree of their reading habit 
regarding newspapers that was then correlated with replies regarding the directions of 
democratisation in Russia. The relationship between the ability to evaluate the 
situation and that reading habit is striking. This was particularly visible with ”difficult 
to say” answers. People reading newspapers every day showed lack of determination 
in 16%. Whereas those who read them ”2-3 times a week” replied “difficult to say” in 
25%; such an answer was given by 21% of respondents reading only ”Saturday and 
Sunday issues”; those who read “rarely” replied “difficult to say” in 31%; and the 
major percentage, i.e. 37% of the undecided ones were people who admitted that they 
did not read newspapers at all (CBOS BS/151/151  November 1998). 
H.  Poland in the “Visegrad Triangle” 
In 1991 a conference was held in Berlin gathering parliamentarians of NATO, neutral 
and postcommunist states. Delegates from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
expressed at that conference their willingness to join NATO (we still had to do with 
political presence of the USSR at that time). Countries being the members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation acknowledged the declaration of accession. Polish 
press quoted the reaction of Western politicians, including among others Gazeta 
Wyborcza that quoted after Reuters the statement by NATO diplomat who said that 
“They perceive us as a guarantor of stabilisation in Europe, perhaps the only one, but 
our capacity is limited.” According to Reuters “NATO guarantees of safety to such 
countries as Poland or Romania are out of the question, because none of the NATO 
countries would consent to give such assurance as it could be deemed a provocation 
in respect of the Soviet Union” (Gazeta Wyborcza 18. 02. 1991). Let the headlines in 
the press at that time testify to the moods of some of the Polish public: ”Cold NATO” 
or ”EU and NATO await summer days”(Gazeta Wyborcza 14. 07. 91).  
        Reserve of Western politicians had many reasons. One should be aware that 
the support, or its lack, for the idea of NATO extension over the former socialist 
states depended on the political interests of individual countries. The objection raised 
 
62 by Western politicians sometimes was an element of internal political struggle. Such 
opinions were quoted, among others, by Gazeta Wyborcza (August 1996) when 
during a convention of democrats the delegates were asked about their attitudes 
towards Polish aspirations to NATO. The vast majority were ”for”, whereas a dozen 
or so people who showed a cautious attitude asked about the tax consequences for 
American citizens and the extent to which that fact would affect the relationship 
between the U.S. and Russia. People were generally aware, both in Poland and in the 
West, that despite declarations that Russia would not tell ”us” what NATO was to do, 
the majority – in an implied meaning – took that aspect of the question into 
consideration. Zbigniew Brzeziński commented on those dilemmas of the Western 
diplomatic service: ”I have never had any doubts that if the West takes a firm stand 
Russia will change its opinion and arrive at the conclusion that agreement is 
favourable for it. This is – as I believe – happening at the moment. The question 
arises instead as to what the extent of concessions to Russia is going to be. What is 
NATO ready to sacrifice for the sake of an amiable agreement with Moscow. If those 
concessions were connected with the granting of an informal status of alliance 
member to Russia with simultaneous more formal limitation of the status of new 
members, it would be really dangerous.” (Wprost 15. 03. 1997). This generally 
friendly attitude started to be predominant around 1992-1993.  
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Illustration 18.  CBOS – BS/17/14.   February 19 
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Therefore countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary judged that 
by forming a certain political structure their lobbying in respect of joining NATO 
would become more effective. The “Visegrad Triangle” became an important  
integrating factor, as well as the political formation with clearly stated political aims 
that has become a point of reference for many politicians. Politicians of the 
”Triangle” acted as a group and were negotiated with also as a group. This made 
international contacts more efficient, too. Public opinion also began to notice the 
advantages of the fact of such a political formation’s existence. Therefore it was not 
surprising that Bill Clinton met with the leaders of the ”Visegrad Triangle”. The 
effects of that meeting, according to Polish public opinion, are presented in the 
diagram below.   
What undoubtedly draws our attention is the group replying difficult to say;  
the motivation to give such an answer is something that we can but guess. These 
might be people who know little about the ”Triangle”, but also people who are aware 
of the consultative, structural and political nature of that platform. It is not a 
formation that has any kind of a formalised mechanism at its disposal – to a greater 
extent it is based on moral obligations. First of all it was recognised that all four 
countries had a specific political interest to carry into effect on the basis of the 
”Triangle”. In this case we come to deal with a specific political fact the 
consequences whereof do not necessarily need to be of material nature. Besides one 
should not wonder that 37% of respondents replied that it was “difficult to say” 
something about the  benefits to Poland. Meetings of that kind create atmosphere, 
allow politicians not only to exchange views, but also to get to know each other in 
person. And these kinds of ”results” are of a quite relative nature. Poles however, 
while asked about their attitude towards the co-operation within the framework of the 
”Triangle” show firm support. In 1995 CBOS asked a question regarding the attitude 
to that political initiative of the Central European countries (Table). As it can be 
noticed, the degree of support can be described as ”nearing euphoria”. Only the idea 
of creating a ”defensive alliance” was approached with certain dose of reserve. In this 
case NATO aspirations of the Visegrad Group countries might have affected the 
content of answers given to the following question(Table 14).  
 
64     Certain group of the Polish society still maintain the conviction in their 
minds that everybody uses us, betrays us, dislikes, persecutes, etc. It is an attitude that 
arouses interest because public opinion in countries that happened to be in exactly the 
same situation as Poland evaluated it in a totally different way. In 1994 instead of an 
”open arms” welcome with respect to, among others, Poland NATO proposed to 
postcommunist countries the ”Partnership for Peace” programme. Major part of 
public opinion received it with bitterness. Such feelings had already been voiced 
before by some of the Polish intellectual establishment. Similar tone is that of a 
statement by Bronisław Misztal, professor of sociology of politics at the Catholic 
University of America in Washington: ”For the Europeans the admission of Poland 
 
                                    Visegrad Group countries are sometimes mentioned, [...]. 
Do you think that the following would be favourable or unfavourable 
from the point of  view of the interests of Poland: 
 
        Respondents’ indications (%)   
No. 
 
                Answers   
 favourable 
     
unfavourable 
Difficult to 
say 
 
  1. 
close business co-operation 
between those countries 
   
 85 
 
 4 
 
11 
 
   2. 
close political co-operation 
between those countries 
 
 81 
 
6 
 
13 
 
   3. 
defensive alliance formed  
by those countries 
 
 76 
 
9 
 
15 
 
                                    Table 15.   CBOS BS/177/152.  October 1995 
 
to NATO would have a symbolic meaning – it would close the balance of 
injustice done to Poles, nonperformed agreements and partitions. The delay of 
decision on admission of Poland to NATO can mean the decrease of chances for such 
a fact taking place” (Rzeczpospolita 11.06.1996). It has to be admitted that this 
statement fitted perfectly into the beliefs of Polish public opinion at that time. In that 
 
65 period some of the public opinion believed that that programme would not be a phase 
of adaptation, but a substitute allowing to keep other countries outside NATO for a 
long time. In a way NATO countries are also to blame because they were not accurate 
enough in determining the function that the Partnership was to fulfil. 
        In February 1994 OBOP measured the attitude of public opinion towards the 
decision of Western countries’ governments denying Poland and other countries an 
immediate admission to NATO. The following question was asked: In connection 
with the refusal to admit Poland to NATO opinions are spread that the West has 
betrayed Poland and other Central European countries. Do you agree with such an 
opinion, or not? As many as 41% of respondents gave an affirmative answer to such a 
question, 36% said that they did not agree with such an opinion while 23% of 
respondents had no opinion at all. This indicates an existing sense of betrayal and, 
what follows, certain frustration awaken by that belief. Let us quote the results of 
research conducted in the Central European countries: 
 
If we do not become NATO members within the next five years, would it be 
because we do not meet requirements, or because the West does not want us? 
 
 
No 
          Country  We do not meet 
requirements. 
The West does not  
want us. 
1  Bulgaria  32 35 
2  The Czech Republic  45 26 
3  Poland  32 x  48 x 
4  Romania  46 29 
5  Slovakia  47 25 
6  Slovenia  46 38 
7  Hungary  61 x  22x  
        Table 16.      OBOP – BS/120/106.  February 1994 
 
       These results evidently show our ”sense of wrong”. The most evident differences 
in the assessment of one’s own activities can be seen in the attitudes of Hungarians 
and Poles. That result makes it undoubtedly worth reflecting on the mental state of 
the Polish society. The surprise is additionally increased by the result achieved during 
 
66 research in 1996, when the public were asked about their views on the Polish Army. 
Let us take a look at the results (Ilustration 19). 
The criticism of respondents that in 67% said that the condition of the Polish 
Army differs, to a larger or smaller extent, from the standards of modernity is a mild 
form of evaluation of the reality. This expression results from a similar estimation 
that was made by soldiers and officers (see subsection ”Army takes the floor”). It (the 
criticism) seems to contradict the argumentation arising from Table 16. On the basis 
of comparison of those two opinion polls it would seem that the delay in our 
admission to NATO had nothing to do with the condition of the Polish Army, but 
 
 
                            How could you describe the Polish Army? Is it: 
4
45%
1
20%
2
22%
3
1%
5
12%
1
2
3
4
5
rather modern 
very modern
definitely not modern
rather not modern
difficult to say
 
     Illustration 19    CBOS – BS 103/101.   July 1996 
 
resulted mainly from somewhat irrational motives? Respondents would seek 
money for the modernisation of the Polish Army mainly in the reduction of the Civil 
Service, withdrawal of subsidies for the insolvent state-owned enterprises (mines, 
railways, steelworks, etc.), as well as in subsidies granted to farmers.  
        On  the  eve  of  the  three  Visegrad  Triangle  countries’  joining  NATO,  i.e.  in 
February two public opinion polling institutes: Polish CBOS and Hungarian TÁRKI 
asked their citizens identical questions. Results may both arouse satisfaction and 
make one smile as the uniformity of replies was in the case of some questions quite 
surprising. 
 
67 Adding up the affirmative and negative responses we would achieve almost 
identical numbers of supporters (Poland: 60%, Hungary: 61%) as well as opponents 
(Poland and Hungary 11% each) among Poles and Hungarians.   Simultaneously one 
may state that this determination of the majority of Poles and Hungarians is rooted in 
this case in political realities. Over 40% of both Poles and Hungarians are aware of 
practical limitations of the army sovereignty that are connected with the membership 
in NATO. Moreover, neither Poles, nor Hungarians forget the role and the potential 
with which they are heading for NATO. 
 
In March Poland and Hungary will officially be admitted to NATO; do you 
personally support the accession of Poland and Hungary to NATO, or do you 
oppose it? (%) 
Poles           
 
       3333   33% 
 
        
         27% 
 
                  
23% 
 
6 % 
5 
%    
6 
% 
 
Hungarians         
 
                    36% 
 
                    
           25% 
 
 
       22% 
    8%    
 
3 
% 
 6 
% 
Legend: 
- I firmly support it 
- I rather support it 
- I neither support, nor oppose it 
- I am rather against it 
- I am definitely against it 
- Difficult to say 
 
Illustration 20.      CBOS – BS/35.  March 1999 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Official admission of the Visegrad Triangle countries to NATO took place 
two weeks before the commencement of NATO forces’ action against Serbia. This 
peculiar ”baptism of fire” largely influenced the way of perceiving our membership in 
 
68 that organisation. As I have mentioned on the occasion of previously formulated 
opinions, we generally judge differently ”when the problem is far away from us”, and 
tend to form different opinions when a given phenomenon may occur or occurs near 
us. The strongest influence on the content of our estimations is exerted first of all by 
personal experience. If we discuss issues connected with NATO countries’ 
intervention and our participation in that undertaking, we must remember that it 
personally affected, after all, only a small proportion of public opinion. One may 
estimate this situation in the best way when one’s own interests are violated. Such a 
question was asked of Poles by CBOS, of Hungarians by TĀRKI, and of Czechs by 
IVVN – research was conducted in January and February 2000. Firstly, in the same 
 
                    Which of the statements does most closely correspond with your  
           views in connection with the accession of Poland and Hungary to NATO: 
 
                                                                                                Poles            Hungarians 
1. Accession to NATO will rather be a guarantee 
      of independence of Poland and Hungary                            41%                   40%   -    
2.  Accession to NATO will rather be a new form of 
     submission of Poland and Hungary to a foreign  
     world-power.                                                                        42%                   47% 
3. Difficult to say                                                                       17%                  13% 
 
Table 16.    CBOS - BS/35.  March 1999 
 
     period of the previous year respondents in those countries were asked the same 
questions. Secondly, in March fell the first anniversary of those countries joining 
NATO. The questions referred first of all to the support, or lack thereof, for (this time 
already) the presence of the Visegrad Triangle countries in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. Constancy that the public of those three countries presented is worthy 
of admiration. Support of Poles and Hungarians amounted to over 60%, and the 
Czechs also showed the stability of ”feelings for NATO”. However, in the case of the 
Czech public opinion we all the time have to do with a considerably higher 
 
69 scepticism. Thus, among the Czechs the degree of acceptance with respect to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation membership continued to amount to 49% in 1999 
and 50% in 2000 (CBOS –BS/45 March 2000). Positive aspects of NATO 
membership are generally estimated by Czechs at the level that is by around 10-15% 
lower than that adopted by Poles and Hungarians. In the research discussed only one 
issue had the same level of acceptance, namely the acknowledgement that ”NATO 
membership contributes to the increase of peace and stabilisation in Europe”: Poles - 
63%, Hungarians - 59% and Czechs - 56%.   
    One of the basic problems that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation currently 
faces is the problem of its further extension. “Visegrad Triangle” countries, as its 
equal members will now participate in the decision making process. Therefore, it is 
interesting what the public in those countries think about the possibility of other 
Central and Eastern European countries joining NATO (Illustration 19). It turns out 
that Poles are the greatest supporters of NATO’s extension to the East. Over a half of 
respondents declare their support for NATO accession of each of the seven countries 
of our region enumerated in the list. The highest number, i.e. three-quarters of 
respondents would indicate Slovakia, whereas two-thirds – Lithuania and Estonia. 
Public opinion in all the three countries seems to be most sceptical with respect to 
NATO membership for Ukraine and Romania. One can say that the greatest restraint 
in that respect ”traditionally” show the Czechs.  
 
I. The will to enlarge NATO among the members of this organisation 
 
The will to enlarge NATO among the members of this organisation may result from 
particular interests of those countries’ societies. Czechs and Hungarians represent 
countries and nations that are not big, and it might be the fear of marginalisation that 
makes them show restraint. The above remarks concern the situation where Visegrad 
Triangle countries will also participate in the admission process of new members. Let 
us take a look at public opinion and views of Western politicians voiced with respect 
to the aspirations of, among others, Poland to join NATO. The more so because one 
should be aware that the ones who take decisions on those issues are politicians. It has 
to be admitted, 
 
70   Do you consider it favourable that the following countries should join NATO? (%) 
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    Illustration 21 CBOS - BS/45   March 2001 
        
however, that in this case Western politicians’ opinions largely corresponded 
with the views of the vast proportion of public opinion. Support for Poland did not 
arouse many objections in the major NATO countries. On 14-20 September 1996, 
within the framework of PIPA Programme at the University of Maryland, research 
was conducted on a random group of 1214 Americans, taking account of their 
declared political sympathies. 64% of the Democrats and 60% of the Republicans 
were ”for” the admission of new members to NATO (Gazeta Wyborcza 15.10.1996).  
 
                                             Support for Poland (%). 
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  Illustration  22.          Polityka 5. 10. 1996 
 
  
 
71      As for other opinion polls (quoted by the same source) during which the 
following question was asked: ”Are you in favour of the admission of such countries, 
as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO?”, 62% of respondents 
expressed their approval, whereas 29% were against, and 9% had no opinion on that 
matter.    
Germans turned out to be the most restrained ones. At the same time it turned 
out that the greatest supporters of the idea of Poland joining NATO were the English. 
The surprise arises from the fact that the English are suspected, in the so-called 
“common consciousness”, of isolationist tendencies. 
 
3. Poland in NATO – hopes and reality. 
         Expectations connected with Poland’s admission to NATO relate to various 
spheres of social life. In practice, it would be difficult to find a sphere of life that 
would not, at least partially, be connected with that fact, from the military issues 
connected with the improvement of army organisation, its armament, training, 
technical culture, etc. to economic and psychological ones. While discussing 
numerous problems in the present study reference was made to those hopes and 
expectations. Shortly before the official admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary to NATO, OBOP asked about the effects that our membership in the 
Alliance would have (Table 17).  
Generally speaking, the above table indicates great optimism. The extent to 
which it corresponds with the present and future situation is undoubtedly debatable. 
Especially the influence of integration with NATO on Polish economy brings results 
that are quite contrary to the expectations. There are opinions that evidently take no 
account of the consequences of integration. Among such one may include issues 
connected with the “limitation of the independence of the Polish army”. Those who 
believe (for instance) that it does not affect the sovereignty of the army seem to be 
wrong because every formation of that kind limits the independence of decision 
processes of a given political entity. Undoubtedly, however, what is important is an 
answer to the question whether it is a result of the given entity’s consent to 
subordination in a voluntary way, or against will. This, however, does not change the 
 
72 essence of the phenomenon that the limitation of independence is. It seems that - 
taking actual benefits into account - effects can be achieved in items 10-12. 
Do you think that the admission of Poland to NATO will result in the following, or 
not? (%) 
 
N
o. 
                
                                        Answer 
 
 Yes     
   
   No 
 No 
opini
on 
1.  Increase in the export of armaments manufactured in 
Poland 
  36  38  26 
2.  Increase of taxes and deterioration of living conditions     47  32  21 
3.  Limitation of independence of the Polish Army     50  29  21 
4.  Better opportunities for the Polish armaments industry    53      26      21 
5.  Increase of foreign subsidies for the modernisation of 
Polish army 
  62      19     19 
6.  Allied troops being stationed in our country    66  14  20 
7.  Enhancement of Poland’s position on the international 
scene 
  74      11      15 
8.  Increase of budgetary expenses on army     78  7  15 
9.  Polish soldiers being sent abroad, to the areas of conflict 
 
  79       8     13 
10
. 
Increase of safety through the inclusion of Poland into the 
Western countries’ framework of defence  
 
  79 
 
8 
 
13 
11  Reinforcement of the Polish army through the 
modernisation of armaments 
 
   82 
 
5 
 
13 
12  Reinforcement of the Polish army through the 
improvement of training 
 
   83 
 
5 
 
12 
 
Table 17.    OBOP – BS/45.   March 1999 
  
In the case of other issues high percentage of affirmative answers confirms the 
awareness that such situations will take place. This relates to, among others, such 
cases as”sending Polish soldiers abroad, to the areas of conflict” or ”increase of 
budgetary expenses on army”. Issues concerning the consequences of integration with 
NATO have been the subject of research already since April 1997. It should be stated 
that choices made by the respondents during previous opinion polls do not differ from 
 
73 those made in February 1999 (the differences are contained within the statistical error 
limits). 
 
Does Poland, in its relationships with other countries, 
sufficiently protect its interests? (%) 
23
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Illustration  23     CBOS – BS/93  June 1999 
 
From the data displayed in Illustration 23 one may draw an obvious 
conclusion that the closer to NATO, the more doubts as to the protection of (Poland’s 
and Poles’) own interests. In this case scepticism was not connected with a single 
spectacular event, like for instance the intervention in Yugoslavia. The tendency, as it 
can be stated while looking at the diagram, is steady. The second conclusion that can 
be drawn on the basis of this attitude is the opposite tendency that appears among 
people who find it difficult to form a univocal opinion. Whereas the intervention of 
NATO in Yugoslavia and our participation in that action strongly influenced the 
opinions relating to the safety of Poland. Owing to the fact that OBOP took the polls 
at about two weeks’ interval and asked identical questions one can make a 
comparative analysis. The relationship between the nature of reply and the events that 
the poll referred to raises hardly any doubts.  
The feeling of safety decreased significantly and, as it can be seen, at all the 
levels: Polish, European and the world one. This situation did not make it possible to 
 
74 detect any regularity as to the features of the social status. What could be seen was 
mainly the chaotic nature of answers. The only criteria that were of any significance 
there were political views (the degree of support for the left wing) and the level of 
interest in politics. 34% of those with leftist tendencies believed that that conflict 
constituted a threat to Poland. Representatives of the right wing expressed such fears 
only in 20%; similar relations occur in the case of Europe and the world. The scale 
moves from left-wing ideas, through central left-wing and central right-wing ones to 
the right-wing views. 
 
Do you think that the war in Yugoslavia may present a threat to Poland? (%). 
 
Indications by dates of opinion polls and choices made.   
     
No. 
 
Issues  Definitely  YES   
Rather YES 
 
Rather NO 
 
Definitely  NO 
1 Safety  of 
Poland 
 
19 
 
23 
 
44 
 
50 
 
24 
 
19 
 
5 
 
2 
2 European 
Safety 
 
22 
 
27 
 
55 
 
54 
 
12 
 
11 
 
2 
 
1 
3 World 
Safety 
 
16 
 
23 
 
46 
 
48 
 
22 
 
20 
 
5 
 
3 
 
      
     Legend:       30-31. 03. 1999                       17-19. 04. 1999 
 
     Table 18.    OBOP – BS/64  April 1999 
 
    Previous  statements  regarding  a  considerable pluralism of views on the 
situation in Serbia find their reflection in subsequent polls conducted in that ‘hot 
period’ (15-17.05.1999) by OBOP. Polish public opinion puts major blame for 
permitting the outbreak of war on Yugoslavian Government: two-thirds of 
respondents believe that it had done little or nothing at all to prevent war, despite 
having such opportunities. Particularly interesting are the remaining replies, namely 
59% of respondents put the blame for the conflict on Russian Government, and 55% - 
 
75 on Serbian nation. The most interesting is the fact that 31% put the blame on 
Albanians from Kosovo and that as many as 29% were certain that NATO ”did 
nothing” or ”little, although could have done more” to prevent the war. Although in 
the opinion of Poles the major culprit is the government of Yugoslavia, only 25% of 
respondents believe that NATO countries’ governments did everything they could to 
prevent the outbreak of war. In July that year CBOS asked a similar question. Results 
achieved by those two polling institutes significantly differ from each other. The 
question asked of people polled by OBOP related directly to those responsible for the 
conflict. It is, however, difficult to compare them in a direct way, as the questions 
were similar to each other only in terms of their scope. In an open question those 
direct culprits were many(Table 19). 
Who, in your opinion, bears the major responsibility for 
the conflict in Kosovo? 
No.                            Categorisation of answers.   Results (%)
1 Slobodan  Milosevic  44 
2  Serbians. Serbia. Yugoslavia  12 
3  Government, authorities, ”leaders” of Serbia and Yugoslavia  8 
4  Both sides of the conflict, ”everyone”  7 
5 NATO  3 
6  The United States and Bill Clinton  2 
7  Albanians, Kosovo Liberation Army  2 
8 Russia  2 
9  General statements, e.g. ”political alliances”, 
 ”fight for influence” 
 
1 
10  Other or unclear ones  3 
11  Difficult to say  25 
 
           Table 19.  CBOS – BS/121  July 1999 
           As it can be seen from the table above the problem of blame has in this 
case been solved by the considerable part of respondents. However, if we add 
“Serbians” as well as the “Government” and “leaders” to “S. Milosevic”, then this 
 
76 group accumulates 64% of indications. Using a similar operation with respect to the 
so-called “Western world” and adding the results: “NATO”’ and “the United States 
and B. Clinton” we achieve 5%. However, the fact that respondents found the war 
difficult to take a univocal stand on is attested to in the best way by the number of 
people who replied that it was “difficult to say”. Opinion polls connected with NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia bring a number of results that can both surprise and 
astonish. Among such surprising opinions one may count for instance the continuing 
high level of acceptance with respect to our membership in NATO, despite sceptical 
and critical opinions regarding the intervention itself. Between February and June 
1999 OBOP asked six times the question: “Generally speaking are you for or against 
our membership in NATO?”. During the polls on 6-8 February 63% of respondents 
expressed their approval, in March those results increased to 65-67%, to reach 70% in 
April and May (OBOP June 1999). And yet during those same polls conducted on 30-
31 May the opponents (46%) of the military intervention outnumbered the supporters 
(44% -?!). 
Final effects of NATO intervention in the Balkans are also - in the estimations of 
public opinion - of a similarly ambiguous nature.  
 
Do you think that the present situation in Kosovo indicates 
that NATO has won the war with Yugoslavia? 
32%
31%
7%
25%
5%
defininitely yes
rather 
yes
rather not
definitely 
not
difficult to say
 
 Illustration 24   OBOP – BS/121.  July 1999 
 
 
77 NATO victory during the armed intervention in Yugoslavia took place mainly in the 
opinion of the biggest cities inhabitants (56%) and people with central – right-wing 
(48%), or right-wing views (47%). Whereas the conviction that NATO did not win the 
war was most frequently expressed by respondents with left-wing (48%), or central – 
left-wing ideas (52% - OBOP July 1999).  
 
                     
Conclusion 
 
              One should state that since 1989 the idea of joining NATO has had a 
considerable group of supporters. As for their political position, in the initial period 
the division into the right wing (supporters) and the left wing (opponents and 
sceptics) was quite distinct. In the course of time, around 1993 in practice, these 
differences had been minimised and in the opinion polls were contained within the 
limits of statistical error. Although it is rather impossible for different opinion polling 
institutes to ask the same questions, the similar meaning of those questions should 
bring similar answers. It has to be acknowledged that in the initial period the major 
polling centres sometimes achieved results that displayed a somewhat bigger 
discrepancy. It did not result from the application of different techniques, content of 
questions or adopted tolerance arising from the so-called statistical errors. One thing 
that does not raise any major doubts is the fact that public opinion displayed greater 
determination in aiming at the integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
than the contemporary political class did. 
       At the same time numerous attitudes and views appeared among the Polish public 
opinion that were of an ambivalent nature. They frequently arose from the 
confrontation of historical experience, stereotypes and phobias with political reality, 
and often also from ignorance or the so-called “false consciousness”. Therefore 
sometimes we could witness the co-existence of fears and hopes in the minds of 
individual people. 
      Polish public opinion frequently displayed views that were rather difficult to 
be logically interpreted. In the years 1991 – 1998 the level of support for the idea of 
joining NATO practically oscillated around 80%. At the same time one expressed, for 
 
78 instance, an aversion to the participation in military operations of NATO, as if those 
issues were to be dealt with by other members, expressing for instance fears that this 
step might involve Poland in armed conflicts. Undoubtedly there is little coherence 
here, especially that it is known that public opinion undergoes waving mainly under 
the influence of current political facts, or pseudo-facts (e.g. media ones). In this 
connection it is easy to imagine situations where the attitude of Polish society and 
individual people towards NATO will undergo changes depending on whether this 
organisation provides safety, or the major effect of that step, i.e. joining NATO is 
going to be the participation of Polish soldiers in interventionist actions in the areas of 
political conflicts. Simultaneously one has to state that some of the public opinion 
showed considerable realism with respect to, e.g. NATO – Russia relationship, or 
benefits that it would bring to the development of various spheres of life, such as - for 
instance - economy. Armaments industry, despite the change in our position towards 
NATO, still seems to be on the downward path, being effectively eliminated from the 
market by the military industry of the member states.  
    The final remark would concern the sore point on the Polish way to NATO, 
i.e. the relationships within the triangle Poland – Russia – NATO. Public opinion 
noticed that problem, as well as its significance. Opinions voiced by the public 
indicated that dodges, concessions or, as V. Havel puts it, excessive submission of 
politicians with respect to political ‘gestures’ of Russians did raise its objection. What 
also irritated was a kind of hypocrisy of mainly Western (but not only) politicians 
“that the opinion of Russia will not affect the decisions of sovereign countries and 
organisations”.  Public opinion noticed those fears and activities that were 
undoubtedly dictated by the attitude of Kremlin.  
     The fact that the Polish society displayed the greatest determination in aiming at 
the integration with political structures of the West fills us with optimism. The best 
illustration of that attitude are comparative polls conducted in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
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